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DETECTING CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT THROUGH 
OPEN DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract: 
Corruption is present in all aspects of the society and it hinders the progress of various sectors of 
the economy. In this context, corruption is defined as the act of dishonesty for personal gain by 
those in power. One of the biggest sectors it influences is public procurement. Previous research 
has shown that corruption is present in public procurement and it reduces the transparency of the 
process. Taking into account the monetary value of the public procurement sector, it is clear that 
this is a problem that must be addressed. Various studies have used qualitative analysis to root 
out the core of the issue, but as it still thrives, it essential that more accurate and acute measures 
are used.  
In order to tackle this problem, there have also been studies that try to quantify the likelihood of 
it, rather than only looking at qualitative research and this is where data analytics comes into play 
– the core of this study. This thesis aims to determine whether using open data resources and data 
analytics it is possible to classify corruption in the public procurement processes and therefore 
suggest a suitable set of data to make the detection of corruption easier and quicker. Building on 
existing work on corruption, it asks: could corruption be predicted on available data and what 
methods should be used?  
Based on a review of the literature on corruption and theories of machine learning, data analytics 
was used to assess possible corruption in public procurement in Estonia. In the data analytical 
process the author used machine learning approaches that predict the classification of 
procurement as corrupt or non-corrupt.  The analysis of the results demonstrated that based on 
available data it is possible to predict corruption in public procurement in Estonia. Furthermore, 
the results also indicate that some features have a bigger impact on corruption in public 
procurement. Taking into account the background, related work and the current results, the author 
suggests that data analytics is vital in the fight against corruption and using machine learning can 
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yield in good results in predicting corruption. Further research is needed to identify other factors 
that could strengthen the effectiveness of these approaches. 
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Corruption, public procurement, machine learning 
CERCS: P160 
 
Annotatsioon: 
Töö pealkiri on: "Korruptsiooni tuvastamine riigihangetes läbi andmeanalüüsi".  
Magistritöö eesmärk oli uurida, kas olemasolevatele andmetele tuginedes ja andmeanalüüsi 
kasutades on võimalik hinnata korruptsiooni tõenäosust riigihangetes ning tulenevalt eelnevast 
anda soovitusi, kuidas andmed enda kasuks korruptsiooni vastu võistluses tööle panna.  
Selleks, et antud eesmärki saavutada, andis autor ülevaate korruptsioonist üldiselt ja 
korruptsioonist riigihangetes. Lisaks andis autor ülevaate viimase aja olulisematest arengutest 
korruptsiooni vastu võitlemises maailmas ning selgitas analüüsis kasutatatud masinõppe 
algoritmide olemust. Korruptsioonile kui probleemile riigihangetes on viidanud mitmed uuringud 
nii Eestis kui mujal maailmas. Autor tugines enda töös riighangete registrist pärinenud andmetele 
ja täiendas neid kohtulahenditest leitud konkreetsete juhtumitega. Kasutades masinõppe 
lähenemisi hindas autor korruptsiooniriski ja visualiseeris tulemusi.   
Andmete analüüsi ja masinõppe algoritmide tulemusena jõudis autor järeldusele, et 
olemasolevate andmete põhjal on võimalik edukalt hinnata korruptsiooniriski riigihangetes 
Eestis. Eelneva põhjal saab seega öelda, et andmete automaatse töötlusega on võimalik 
korruptsiooniriski tuvastamise protsessi muuta efektiivsemaks, mis omakorda hoiab kokku 
kaasnevat ressurssi. Lähtudes teooriast ja tehtud praktilisest tööst, esitas autor enda poolsed 
soovitused, milliste andmete kasutamisel ja analüüsil oleks võimalik korruptsiooniriski tuvastada 
ja seeläbi korruptsiooniriski maandada.  
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1.INTRODUCTION  
In modern societies public procurement is one of the ways governmental agencies take help from 
sources outside the public sector to achieve a task [1]. Transparency International (TI) defines 
public procurement as “the acquisition by a government department or any government-owned 
institution of goods or services.” [2] For example, the need to build public roads is satisfied 
through public procurement. In the process of public procurement corruption might partially 
happen because the whole process of public procurement might not be clear. 
Corruption can be and has been defined in various ways, but the World Bank puts it simple – 
corruption is the use of public or private office for personal gain [3], [4]. In particular, public 
procurement corruption is one of the most common means of using one’s position for private gain 
and it is seen as the most vulnerable to corruption [5]. There have been efforts to manage the 
problem by implementing laws on institutions to publish open data to provide further 
transparency. The World Bank makes a distinction between two separate categories of corruption 
that could be applied to public procurement – state capture and administrative corruption [6]. 
Corruption in public procurement can have various effects on the country’s economy. For 
example, it can often increase the cost and lower the quality of goods that therefore do not match 
customers’ needs [4]. The OECD has assessed that corruption in public procurement costs 
between 20 to 25% of the respective country’s budget [7].  There are also indirect costs that must 
be taken into account, like the distortion of competition, limited market access and low interest 
on foreign investments. Due to this, it is highly important to detect cases, where corruption might 
be happening in a timely manner and this is the aspect, where data analysis comes into play.  
In the past, corruption has been analysed from different angles. For example there have been 
studies to discover the reasons why corruption takes place [1], [5], [8]–[11]. Also, there have 
been studies that look at corruption through qualitative research [12]–[18]. Analysing these 
papers, the author believes that a lot can still be done to make the process of public procurement 
more transparent by putting the data to work for us. Currently, the indexes like the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s fight against corruption 
are all based subjective opinions of experts, who perceive the corruption of each country at 
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certain levels, based on the economic and political activity. Estonia is ranked number 18 with a 
score of 73 out of 100 in the 2018 CPI list. Compared to neighbouring countries like Russia with 
a score of 28 and Latvia with a score of 58, Estonia is doing well [2].  
In comparison to the qualitative research, there are also studies that detect corruption through 
more data based approaches [19]–[23]. Although the number of studies on corruption through 
data analysis is increasing, there is still less work published on the topic than comparative and 
qualitative research, due to the fact that corruption is a complex phenomenon. Currently data 
analytics has been widely used in banking and fraud related papers [24]–[29]. This means that 
similar approaches can also be used in combating corruption.  
In this work, the author has taken data analytical approach to detect corruption in public 
procurement in Estonia. The data has been collected from Open Tenders website [30]. The total 
data observations consist of 104 414 observations, where each observation was tagged manually 
for the corrupt cases. After thorough cleaning and processing of the data, supervised machine 
learning classification techniques, like Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, Random Forest and 
XGBoost were applied to estimate the models’ capability to predict the likelihood of corruption. 
The models have shown an accuracy of 68,6 % up to 100% and ROC from 68,4% to 100%, 
which indicates that the data based approach taken is efficient in this topic.  
The main goal of this thesis is to find out, whether using open data resources and data analytics it 
is possible to classify corruption in the public procurement processes and therefore suggest a 
suitable set of data to make the detection of corruption easier and quicker.  
In order to achieve this, the author will conduct empirical analysis and will investigate, if it is 
possible to detect corruption using data science. The goal of the thesis will be achieved by using 
data analytics to build a model to estimate the probability of corruption.  In order to validate the 
results from data analysis, it will be compared against findings in related work on the topic of 
corruption detection using data analysis.  
In Estonia the establishment of e-government and digital public procurement register has helped 
to make the data available that is needed to assess the bids made during the process. Still it is 
plausible that the necessary data needed might not be accessible or recent enough to carry out this 
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research. So, the author will rely on open-data that is up-to-date and available. The author will 
use various features in the dataset. In addition, most important features will be generated based 
on feature ranking and applied to the models.   
To the best of the authors’ knowledge this is the first work that has analysed this dataset in 
machine learning approach to detect corruption in public procurement in Estonia. The value of 
this thesis is in finding a useful set of data features that can be used to make corruption detection 
faster and more efficient. The author believes that with sufficient data a lot can be done to help 
governmental agencies in the screening of businesses during public procurement. This will lead 
to an honest market from what the end users and the economy will benefit.  
The thesis is constructed into five major sections. In the first the author will introduce the main 
topics of the thesis. Then the author will give an overall background to the problem of corruption 
and the effects it has on the economy. In the background section the author will open the main 
subjects to the reader, in order to enable continuous flow throughout the thesis. The third section 
of the thesis is dedicated for related work on topics relevant to this thesis. In the fourth section the 
author will cover the chosen research method and chosen data, as well as data processing. The 
final part shows the results of the research and compares it with the theoretical background and 
how it all bounds together. The thesis is ended with conclusions and recommendations for further 
research.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
In this section, the author provides an overview of the main topics discussed over the course of 
this thesis. For example, this section discusses the reasons to eradicate corruption and how public 
procurement fits into the picture of corruption. Also, there is a short introduction to the machine 
learning methods, which are used for analysis.  
2.1. Reasons to eradicate corruption  
Corruption influences the flow of the economy and brings dishonest benefits to the people 
involved. Since it is a problem, there have been various studies conducted on the effects 
corruption has on the society [8], [10], [15], [31], [32]. It may be also seen as a natural part of the 
economy and the tool to get things done, but the negative effects of corruption do not justify this 
behaviour.   
For example, Vadi et al. bring out aspects from their empirical study based on qualitative 
research conducted on company managers in Denmark and Estonia and how these people see the 
influence of corruption in their everyday work [15]. First, managers in both countries have found 
that loss of reputation is most probable, although they are more outspoken in Denmark - two 
thirds of the Danish managers believe that corruption will damage the company’s reputation. 
Second, the Danes appear to be more concerned about the damage that such a case could do to 
their own career (63% compared to only 38% in Estonia) and finally around 50% of responses 
acknowledge possible financial losses in both countries.  
Then there is the study by Eugeni and Tosato, who bring out aspects that also support the views 
of Salih on the effects of corruption [8], [33]:  
• Corruption causes bureaucratic inefficiency by creating unnecessary tasks that hinder the 
workflow of the bureaucratic machinery;  
• It influences the business and (local) investment climate by making the market an unfair 
playing field, where tenders with higher bribes will be chosen over price and quality;  
• Civil and political rights are not followed as the act of corruption violates open market 
principles;  
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• Economic growth stifles due to corruption; 
• Foreign direct investment goes down, since foreign investors are not interested in markets 
that unreasonably favour; 
• International trade is influenced by choosing local companies due to bribery over foreign 
cooperation that might be beneficial in the long-term;  
• Political legitimacy is put under pressure, since political campaigns are funded through 
private investors, which can include hidden agendas;  
• Shadow economy grows.  
As it can be seen in the list above, the effects of corruption are wide and influence various aspects 
of the economy. It stifles the economic growth and makes the business climate less attractive for 
investors. The consequences of corruption in public procurement can come through rent seeking 
and state capture. For example, rent seeking in public procurement can cause a lot of issues:  
• Projects can have worse price to quality ratio, which depends on corruption rather that the 
actual bid [34]; 
• Rent seeking increases expenditures and the bigger the project the higher the bribe [35]; 
• Affects the allocation of resources as projects with easier corruption options are chosen 
[34];  
• Laws can be influenced and made for corruption [5]. 
State capture is the second aspect of corruption in public procurement. It can be defined as 
bending the rules for one’s good, which weakens the state’s capacity or commitment to enhance 
security of property and contract rights, a weakening that further amplifies the incentives of other 
firms to influence on state activity by the help of corruption, representing a vicious cycle [1]. 
As previously brought out in the general issues, corruption in public procurement may also abate 
the international interest in both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) [36]. In the paper Wei 
brings out that the reason why corruption is “higher taxing than tax itself” is that it is arbitrary 
and uncertain. This uncertainty effects public procurement processes, because in its essence it is a 
non-public auction site, where the best tender wins, but due to the possibility of corruption the 
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best quality-to-price ratio may not actually be the contractor. This may lead the economy into a 
never-ending cycle, ending up in circumstances under which corruption is the standard, where 
honesty is too costly, with a general disregard of law and a higher level of criminal activity.  
There are clear reasons why corruption should become a thing of the past, but it still thrives with 
deep roots in the society. Luckily, illicit behaviour manifests itself in detectable data and now 
there are tools to put this data to proper use. If the same data points across projects are tracked 
over a certain time period, the behavioural patterns that indicate corruption risk can be 
recognized. This is where data analytics and machine learning become of value.   
2.2. Public procurement, data and corruption  
Public procurement refers to all of the offers that have been put up by the governmental bodies to 
satisfy the economy’s needs, ranging from bids for bed sheets to construction works. This covers 
the whole process from start to end, which means that there are a lot of counterparties involved 
and the risk for corruption is high. Transparency International (TI) defines public procurement as 
“the acquisition by a government department or any government-owned institution of goods or 
services.” [4] Public procurement corruption is one of the most common means of using one’s 
positions for private gain and it can be seen as the most vulnerable to corruption. The World 
Bank makes a distinction between two separate categories of corruption that could be applied to 
public procurement [3]:  
1) State capture, which refers to processes by individuals, groups, or organizations to 
influence public policy formation by illegally transferring private benefits to public 
officials (i.e., efforts by private actors to shape the institutional environment in which they 
operate); and  
2) Administrative corruption, which refers to the use of the same type of corruption and 
bribes by the same actors to interfere with the proper implementation of laws, rules, and 
regulations.  
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Public procurement process is complex and exploiting various aspects of the system can cause 
corruption. For example, the corruption through hidden violations of ordinary procurement rules, 
which include [1]:  
• Power of invitation – the officials can have the leverage to decide, who to invite on the 
tender;  
• Short-listing/pre-qualification – higher weight on one particular criteria of evaluation met 
by the brining company only;  
• The choice of technology;  
• Confidential information – knowing beforehand the importance of various parameters of 
evaluation;  
• Modification of the contract.  
Although, there are also legitimate ways of deviating from honest public procurement, for 
example [1]:  
• Justification for bilateral negotiation of governmental contracts;  
• Major events and states of emergency – speed may help to deviate from the standard 
procedure;  
• “Grease the wheel payments” – corruption without a specific case.  
As it can be seen in the text above, there are various ways of manipulating tenders and bids 
during the public procurement process. This means that is vital to utilise data in the fight against 
corruption.   
Most research that has been conducted on corruption on public procurement has been qualitative 
and based on various indexes that gave a perception of the level of corruption in a region or 
country. The first generation of corruption indexes was developed in order to measure general 
corruption levels in a country through surveys of the public and so-called ‘expert witnesses’. An 
example of this is the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) [37]. The 
index does not understand the experience of corruption, rather it is based on perceptions and due 
to the fact that corruption has been seen as a sensitive topic during its development processes, it 
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could be possible that respondents were not be willing to discuss the actual situation. Due to these 
reasons, there are flaws that let down these indexes. For example, perceptions are often 
influenced by the media and one-off events like scandals, or by the culturally determined 
preconceptions of experts [38]. Another problem with the CPI is that few respondents have 
experience of the full range of public services, which might be affected by corruption and 
therefore, their views may not be accurate for services, where they have no personal experience. 
Public procurement is a classic example, where few members of the public will have direct 
experience and due to this it is one of the most corrupt sectors [7].  
 
Thankfully, there is a lot of data generated in public procurement, which means that data can be 
seen as a key to understanding the possibilities of fighting corrupt behaviour and rooting out the 
old mind-set that in order to get things done, one needs to bribe [20]. This thesis presents 
available open data and empirical evidence on corruption in public procurement—an important 
issue that imposes political, economic, and environmental costs to societies around the world. 
Corruption is a phenomenon that involves many different aspects, and due to this it is difficult to 
assign a precise and comprehensive definition. However, the common aspect of most corruption 
definitions is the idea that a corrupt act refers to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain 
[3]. Bribery, favourism, and embezzlement are the most common examples. There are also more 
subtle or sometimes even legal examples in the public procurement processes, which include 
lobbying and patronage. 
These are some of the common ways to lever the procurements in chosen directions. In order to 
uncover these tilted offers, this thesis will look into the e-procurement data in Estonia and will 
use previously established red flags or indicators of corruption. The red flags can be defined as 
indicators that show a potential risk of corruption. If a red flag is present, it does not 
automatically mean that an act has been corrupt, but it gives a indication that there might be a 
threat [20].  
Recently there has been an increase of using data in the fight against corruption. For example, 
Fazekas et al. look in their work at the public procurement data in Hungary and provide new 
insights on the topic [19], [20]. There are also publications by the European Commission and 
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other authors that all have aspects in common [39]–[41]. The indicators developed can be divided 
into three stages of the process: submission, assessment and delivery phase of the procurement.  
 
In the studies on red flags, the most important indicator that was brought out constantly was 
single bidding. Whether a tender only got a single bid, or during the assessment phase a single 
bid was left on the table. It was also mentioned that procurement data red flags go together with 
data on company registries, financial information, ownership information and network analyses 
that connect buyers and bidders. This is an aspect that should be sought after– building the 
understanding, what data should go together with public procurement and could support it. 
Looking at the related work, we can see, what have been the common grounds and build on our 
dataset by looking at relevant information that might prompt red flags. In order to avoid false 
flagging, it is important to employ and strategy of triangulation, so that it creates a good base for 
the accuracy of the actual indicator. Triangulation is the technique of using multiple methods of 
analysis on the same subject to confirm the validity of the results [42]. It is vital, because the 
existence of red flags does not mean that the act is automatically corrupt, but it creates a risk 
index that there is a possibility for that. Red flags can be seen as a tool in the fight against 
corruption, as indicators to detect, but also to prevent it. 
2.3. Data and machine learning as tools against corruption   
The available data on public procurement has been there for some time, but it never has been put 
to the use the way that it could be. Long-run data on corruption is a limited resource, but various 
cases and current media output suggest that corruption has been around in the societies over a 
long time period. The complexity and hidden nature of corruption makes it complicated to 
measure. So far, the data on corruption has usually been coming from either direct observation 
through law enforcement records and audit reports, or perception surveys like the Corruption 
Perception Index.  
A solution to the data problem could be the use of electronic systems to track public procurement 
offers. For example, in Estonia the use of online systems to carry out tenders means that more 
and more data comes available [43].  The turn towards e-procurement is encouraged by the 
OECD and Korea’s KONEPS system has been brought out as a good example [7]. This presents 
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an opportunity that has to be put to use. The public procurement system in Estonia went 100% 
electronic from 18.10.2018 [43].  The webpage accepts tenders, publishes offers and announces 
winners. It has been developed to make the process more honest and transparent. This means that 
there is plenty of data on public procurement, which can be sorted, analysed and published.  
Using machine learning techniques, data can be analysed and the red flags of public tender 
processes could be developed and then the probability of corruption can be assessed. The author 
will now explain what are red flags in public procurement and how these can be used to scrape 
out corruption together with machine learning. Red flags can be also defined as corruption 
indicators in public procurement. These are developed metrics that can show, whether a tender 
could have an inclination towards corruption or not. There are studies that have collected and 
gathered the main red flag indicators, which are most common and seen the most often in corrupt 
cases [19]–[21], [39], [44]–[47].  
Nowadays there is a lot of data available for analysis and the amount of data grows constantly 
[48]. In order to make use of this data, tools are needed. This is were data mining and machine 
learning come into play. Lying hidden in all this data is information, potentially useful 
information, that we rarely make explicit or take advantage of. Data mining is the process of 
finding common patterns in data with the assistance of methods like machine learning, statistics 
and artificial intelligence [48]. It is used to predict future values, instead of looking at predictive 
analysis that looks at historical data. There are benefits to using data mining in decision analysis. 
First, it automates the decision making, since it is running constantly and is not delayed by 
human judgment. Second, data mining is used to facilitate planning and will provide managers 
with reliable forecasts based on past trends and current conditions. This all comes together for a 
save in costs and effort. Data mining makes daily routine decisions easier to grasp and is useful 
for planning future plans with it’s predictions [49].  
In this thesis the focus will be on machine learning, but the analysis involves all of the aspects of 
data mining. Therefore, machine learning is a subset of data mining and it helps us understand 
patterns in the data. Machine learning is a mathematical computing algorithm that provides 
systems the ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being explicitly 
programmed [48], [50]. Machine learning algorithms use datasets, where all instances are 
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represented by the same set of features, which may be continuous, categorical or binary. If 
instances are given with known labels (the corresponding correct outputs) then the learning is 
called supervised [51]. 
In this thesis the author will use supervised machine learning algorithms. Supervised machine 
learning algorithms can be used to apply past experiences to produce general hypotheses, which 
then make predictions about future instances. This means that a classifier is created to evaluate 
the model in terms of predictor values and this resulting classifier is used to assign certain values 
to the testing class that is unknown [51]. In this thesis there is a training set that is created to build 
a concise model that will generate future predictions on whether a public procurement process is 
corrupt or not. The analysis is conducted in R – a free software environment for statistical 
computing and graphics. In R the author will use machine learning techniques like Logistic 
Regression, Decision Tree, Random Forest and XGBoost. In order to evaluate the model the 
author will use data mining metrics for example like recall, precision, F1, ROC curves, AUC and 
accuracy.  
The first machine learning approach the author uses in the thesis is Logistic Regression. Logistic 
regression (LR) is useful in problems, where fraud is binary and in this dataset and thesis, the 
instance of corruption is a binary feature. Previous publications in connected fields have 
estimated logistic models of fraudulent claims in insurance, food stamp programs, and so forth 
[28], [52]–[54]. It has been brought out that identifying fraud can be seen as a similar problem as 
real life decisions, like medical and epidemiological [27].  
The second technique is Decision Tree. This is a predictive modelling approach that uses a 
decision tree to move from observational values to target values about an item [48], [55]. Each of 
the nodes in a decision tree represents a feature in an instance to be classified, and each branch 
within the tree is a value that the node can assume. Starting at the root node the instances are 
classified and sorted on the basis of their feature values [51].  
Then there is random forest. This method combines the random subspace method with bagging to 
build an ensemble of decision trees. Random forests need only two easily set parameters, which 
makes them simple to use, and multiple researchers have found that it has excellent performance, 
20 
 
when it comes to the choice of the ensemble method for decision trees. Furthermore, they are also 
computationally efficient and robust to noise [56]. It has been found by various studies that 
random forests perform better, when comparing them to Support Vector Machines and other 
more modern techniques [57], [58]. The last supervised machine learning approach that the 
author uses to assess the data is XGBoost. XGBoost stands for extreme gradient boosting and the 
system is available as an open-source package. XGBoost is an ensemble learning method and it 
has been widely used after the initial launch in 2014. The key success factor for XGBoost has 
been the scalability in all scenarios and it is capability of running ten times faster than other 
methods [59]. 
The goodness of an algorithm can be shown through metrics. The first common machine learning 
metrics the author will explain are precision and recall. In order to understand the idea behind 
precision and recall, the basic principles of Type I and Type II error must be explained. These 
terms revolve around the rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis. The decision made by 
the classifier in a binary decision problem, as is the labeling of corruption, is represented in a 
structure known as a confusion matrix or contingency table. The used examples are labeled as 
negative or positive (Table 1). Type I error, also known as false positive, is the rejection of a true 
null hypothesis. Type II error, also known as false negative, is the non- rejection of a false null 
hypothesis. Precision and recall are therefore calculated as shown in Table 1 and it can be said, 
that precision represents the percentage of the results, which are relevant. Recall depicts the 
percentage of total relevant results that have been correctly classified by the algorithm [60]. 
To understand all of these metrics depicted in Table 1, it is important to cover the aspect of 
Confusion Matrix, which is also used in this thesis. Confusion Matrix is utilized in a 
classification problem, where the output variable is of two or more classes [61]. In it’s essence it 
is simple, as it depicts the relationships between two dimensions: Actual and Predicted. It 
classifies the True Positives, True Negatives, False Negatives and False Positives. Confusion 
Matrix can be seen as a base for all other classification metrics discussed.  
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Table 1. The calculation of metrics, compiled by author; sources [60]–[62] 
Metric Calculation Value to thesis 
Precision  True Positive / Actual Results 
or 
True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive) 
Gives an estimate how precise the 
model is in classifying procurements 
as corrupt 
Recall True Positive /Predicted Results 
or 
True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative) 
Maximise Recall (minimise false 
negatives) 
Accuracy (True Positive + True Negative) / Total Accuracy is good to use, when the 
target variable classes in the data are 
nearly balanced  
F1 2 * Precision * Recall / (Precision + Recall) Harmonic mean of both Precision 
and Recall 
Specificity True Negative / (True Negative + False Positive)  Exact opposite of Recall and Recall 
has to be as high as possible 
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve is used for classification problems at multiple 
thresholds settings. ROC is a probability curve and AUC (Area Under the Curve) represents the 
degree or measure of separation, as it says how well a model is able to distinguish between 
classes. When the AUC is higher, it means the model is better at predicting certain values at their 
set levels. In relation to the thesis, the higher the AUC, the better the model is at distinguishing 
between corrupt and non-corrupt cases. The ROC curve is plotted with True Positive Rate (TPR) 
against the False Positive Rate (FPR) where TPR is on y-axis and FPR is on the x-axis [60]. 
Other metrics used in this thesis are Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE). These metrics show how far the predicted values were from the actual output [62].  
In the next section of the thesis the author will give an overview of related work that is essential 
to this topic. The author will explain, how data mining has been used in corruption detection and 
what have been the biggest discoveries and trends.  
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3. RELATED WORK 
In this section the author will cover the related work that has looked at corruption and its analysis 
in the past. The author will give an overview of various methods that have been used and the 
reasoning for using machine learning to predict corruption.  
3.1. Corruption in public procurement  
It is clearly presented in almost all of the research on corruption that it has effects on the 
economy and mostly negative. In the background the author gave a brief overview of the effects 
and causes of corruption, but in this section the author will take a deeper look into the related 
work on this topic.  
3.1.1 Reasons for corruption  
As it turns out people can find reasoning to being corruptive. This is indicated by the growing 
research on the topic and related news articles that are generated at regular intervals. Even if 
everyone knows that a corrupt act is not only morally wrong, but also has some other 
implications on the market or the whole economy - there are still people, who are willing to take 
this step.  
The first justification people turn to is the ‘everyone-else-does-it’ argument, which normalizes 
unethical behaviour by suggesting a socially acceptable norm, even if it is not legal – an idea 
presented by Ashford and Anand [63],  which means that bribery can be justified by the managers  
through arguing that competitors are also doing it. Second, Anand et al. present in another paper 
that circumstances beyond their control also work as a rationalisation strategy. This refers to peer 
pressure or the act of following an order by higher-ranking employee – ways of discrediting 
yourself from the responsibility [64]. Third and fourth rationalisations are that there are perceived 
positive effects coming or the act of corruption helps to prevent conflicting goals [65]. This 
reasoning strategy can take either a collective or an individual form. In the private companies, the 
managers could therefore reason that bribing took place, because the wellbeing of the company 
was at stake and/or that it helped keep a job.  
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Naturally there are not only personal reasons that promote corruption. Tanzi looks into the causes 
that increase corruption demand and supply [5]. The causes that promote corruption demand are: 
regulations and authorisations; certain characteristics of the tax systems; certain spending 
decisions; provision of goods and service at below-market prices. These are brought into the 
economy both by governmental decisions and individual moral. Tanzi also brings out the causes 
that promote corruption supply: the bureaucratic tradition; the level of public sector wages; the 
penalty systems; institutional controls; the transparency of laws; the examples set by the 
leadership [5].  
Therefore there care clear-cut reasons for corrupt behaviour and since it is a criminal act, people 
try to rationalise their decisions. Still, corruption disrupts the flow of the economy and brings 
dishonest benefits to the people involved.   
3.1.2 Effects of corruption  
After the reasons for corruption it is suitable to understand the effects of this behaviour. The 
effects of corruption can vary amongst regions and countries. There have been multiple studies 
tackling this question and in this section the author will highlight aspects from these papers.  
As previously brought out in the background section, Eugen and Tosato present ideas on the 
effects of corruption, which coincide with the views of Salih [8], [33]. These papers also shed 
light to new perceptions of effect like brain drain, fiscal debt and the value of human capital goes 
down. This means that there is the possiblity of losing valuable talent that do not feel comfortable 
in this dishonest market and are seeking a way out. Also, in the background section the author 
covered ideas presented by Vadi et al., who bring out aspects from their empirical study based on 
Denmark and Estonia [15].  Fortunately, these are not the only two important papers on the 
effects of corruption.  
Transparency International has gathered knowledge from various publications and has compiled 
it into one table. The table depicts the impact of corruption, if it were to increase by one unit [66]. 
From Table 3 (refer to Appendix 1) it can be seen that corruption has effect on individuals, 
society and the economy. The aspects of life most influenced by corruption according to this 
study are -  the income of the poor and student dropout rate. Furthermore, Li et al. find in their 
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study that corruption can have an inverted U-shaped effect on income distribution [67]. This 
means that if corruption increases, the income distribution lowers and if the corruption decreases, 
the income distribution grows. They also indicate that corruption influences the Gini differential 
across developing and industrial countries to a large extent. Their last takeaway is that corruption 
seems to hold back economic growth. As it can be read from findings on the table of impact of 
corruption (see Appendix 1), investments and quality of roads lose a lot from corruption. Similar 
findings can be seen in Hakkala et.al [31] work, where they use data from Swedish companies to 
assess corruption effect on foreign direct investment. They conclude that based on their data 
corruption lowers the likelyhood of investments to a specific country.  
Corruption also affects social aspects, as again can be seen from Appendix 1, since it increases 
child mortality rate, school dropout rate and decreases the ratio of public health investments.  
These numbers are supported by Akcay [68], where he looks into the relationship between 
corruption and human development. In his work he compares three different corruption indexes 
to the human development index in 63 countries. The results clearly indicate that there is 
statistically significant relationship between corruption indexes and human development.  
The litarature is clear that corruption affects everybody and everything, the effect of it may vary 
from country to country, but it exists in the society [5], [8], [32], [34], [69].  
3.1.3 Corruption in public procurement 
Public procurement amounted to 2 trillion euros expenditure in 2017 in the EU alone, which 
makes it a high value option for corruption [70]. There are further aspects, like the complexity of 
the process, the high number of stakeholders involved and the close interaction between public 
and private sector, that make public procurement one of the most vulnerable to corruption [7].   
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Figure 1. General government procurement as percentage of GDP in OECD countries in 2015, source: [71].  
Corruption in public procurement can happen in both country or sub-country levels [7]. This is 
due to the fact that in lower hierarchies of the nation it may be easier to take advantage of the 
proximity of agencies and the weakness of the controlling counterparties.   
Soreide gives a good overview of the most common ways of performing corruption in public 
procurement [1]. First, the public officials use their power to invite enterprises of their own 
choosing to the tender. This category is called the power of invitation. It has many ways of 
unravelling, either through postponing the release of tender information as long as possible or 
inviting companies, which are not suitable to win the procurement. Second, the approach of 
short-listing or pre-qualifying, where companies are evaluated based on some qualitative 
requirement like previous experience. The same aspect is brought out in other papers as well, for 
example Fazekas et.al [19], where they have taken a more data analytical approach, but also 
tender manipulation through previously set qualifications is seen as a red flag indicator of 
corruption. Thirdly Soreide brings out the choice of technology, where qualifications are 
specified in order to match the technological capabilities of the bribing company. Then there is 
the way of keeping confidential information that might be relevant to the decision. For example, 
execution time and cost of utilisation can be seen as qualitative requirements, rather than 
evaluating the tender on merely cost basis. Last is the modification of contract, which is 
highlighted in various papers and also in data analytical research about corruption. In their works 
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Fazekas et al. [25], Barett et al. [26] and Ferwerda et al.  [44] all mark the modification of 
contract as a possible indicator of corruption.  
This section emphasises the real threat that is corruption in public procurement. Due to the fact 
that it is a high monetary value sector and has technicalities that people can exploit, it can be said 
to be one of the most prone towards corruption. 
3.2. Methods to prevent and detect corruption   
3.2.1 Qualitative methods  
As brought out in the background section, the most common analysis methods to describe 
corruption have been indexes, like the corruption perception index (CPI) presented by 
Transparency International [38]. The author will take a deeper look into the pros and cons of 
these methods, which have been analysed on various papers. Overall it can be said that indexes 
work, but they are biased as it is based on emotion and can be influenced by recent events. The 
first generation of corruption indicators thus sought to measure general corruption levels in a 
country through surveys of the public and so-called ‘expert witnesses’. Transparency 
International’s corruption perceptions index (CPI) is an example of such a measure. The index is 
based on perceptions rather than experience of corruption because, at the time it was introduced, 
corruption was thought to be such a sensitive topic that respondents would not be willing to 
discuss experiences.  
As previously stated, there are however some flaws that these indexes carry. Ko and Samajdar 
evaluate in their paper, whether the CPIs can be trusted or not. In their work they come to 
conclude that more attention should be paid by the researches in order to minimize the impact of 
measurement error by conducting thorough data screening and robustness tests based on various 
data sources and methods [18]. The same perception of the lack of value in indexes is a key point 
in Corvino et al. International Monetary Fund research paper, where they attempted to address 
these limitations by leveraging news media coverage of corruption [72].  
The design of surveys to measure corruption in public procurement can be viewed along two 
crosscutting dimensions. On one dimension, the sample of respondents can be drawn from either 
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the contracting authorities or the contractors, while the survey can seek to measure either 
perceived corruption or experiences of corruption [14], [38], [73]. As usual there are also 
contradicting viewpoints that suggest that the current system is working after all and the 
assumptions of the problems in perceptions or surveys is nothing but exaggerated. In the paper, 
Charron highlights the fact that the consistency between actual reported corruption, as well as 
citizen and expert perceptions of corruption, is remarkably high and such perceptions are swayed 
little by ‘outside noise’ [74].  
There are new researches that want to make the work of qualitative studies on corruption more 
efficient. For example Ullah and Arthanari have developed a theoretical framework, which could 
be used to study corruption dynamics by means of system dynamics. The methodology they 
employed was a case study in which, semi structured interviews with key stakeholders such as: 
government ministries, donor agencies, judiciary, police departments, non-governmental 
organizations and the general public were conducted. On the basis of literature and social theory 
they developed three preliminary Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) models of corruption [14].  
Most of these methods require a lot of workforce and take a long time to compile. This way the 
governmental agencies are always a step behind. This can be seen in the vast list of corruption 
prevention methods brought forward in the medical industry [75]. This being said, the qualitative 
research has some valid points in eradicating the corrupt mind-set from the beginning. For 
example Vadi et al. present ideas to prevent corruption in the first place. These thoughts are valid 
and should be taken into account.  They brought out four recommendations that were based on 
their study on Estonian and Danish businesses [15]:  
• Recommendation 1: Based on discussions between middle-office executives and business, 
a one-page manual for how to recognize business corruption should be developed and 
made available for all employees. 
• Recommendation 2: Develop a toolkit that helps the firms identify areas, where integrity 
may be at risk in their processes.  
• Recommendation 3: Taking in the examples established in other Nordic countries, like 
Finland, it could be beneficial to get access to background check during the hiring 
process.  
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• Recommendation 4: Companies should make reporting available through multiple 
channels and it should be specified, encouraged and known as a solution.  
The value of qualitative research is there, as it gives in insight to the reasons of corrupt acts and 
helps root out corruption from the start. In order to prevent corruption it is necessary to 
understand it and how to help companies or employees deal with corruption.  
3.2.2 Data analytics, corruption and machine learning  
It appears that since 2000 the literature on corruption has been increasing exponentially and 
plenty of analysis has been done on rooting out corruption. There are several reviews of the 
economic literature on corruption in public procurement that are provided, for instance by 
Søreide [14], Rose-Ackerman [29] and Rose-Ackerman and Palifka [30]. This literature has been 
mainly dealing with the institutional environments throughout which corruption prospers (e.g. 
Goel and Nelson [31]–[33]; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. [34]–[36]; Acemoglu and Robinson [37]) on 
the incentives of officers to demand and take bribes (e.g. Campos and Pradhans [38]; Rose-
Ackerman and Søreide [39]; Søreide and Williams [40]) and on the negative welfare 
consequences of corruption (e.g. Mauro [41]; Wei dynasty [24]; Vinod [42]). This literature 
reflects the broader efforts of the international community to carry awareness of the harmful 
effects of corruption and to grasp the corruption development. To highlight, the recommendations 
converge. 
One of these recommendations is that the use of indicators of corruption to separate corrupt from 
non-corrupt public procurements can be beneficial, when separating it between sectors and 
countries. This logic continues on. The reason why indicators are beneficial is that that corrupt 
activities need certain types of economic behaviour (e.g. single bids, very rich public officials, 
public procurement contracts that need rewriting or are appealed) and this behaviour leaves traces 
[29]. Consequently, corruption indicators are accumulations of traces, which will purpose to the 
presence of corrupt activities. Consequently, they are primarily geared towards serving to 
practitioners, investigators and policy manufacturers in estimating the prospect of corruption of 
an exact procurement case and lay the groundwork for the inspiration of a replacement evidence-
based approach to fighting corruption. 
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The literature on corruption indicators has been systemically targeted on analysing atypical 
samples, and consequently may be seen to suffer from a general choice bias drawback. The 
European Commission conducted an analysis on the red flags of fraud, which included 
corruption, also in public procurement, built on the known data of corrupt or suspected cases, 
which had been brought out in the annual reports against fraud [30]. This report supported the list 
of indicators for corruption in public procurement, which had been composed by the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners. The overlapping of results is not surprising, since both lists are 
composed on the data of acknowledged fraud case investigations [31]. Similarly, in 2011, the 
European Anti-Fraud Office revealed an inventory of structural indicators of fraud in countries 
and the research was supported by the fact-finding experience the OLAF had accumulated over 
the years. It created use of anonymous cases that are investigated by the OLAF, where elements 
of fraud had been detected. Knowing the particularities of the cases regarding the investigation 
and having a deeper understanding of what has gone wrong in that specific case, OLAF was able 
to conduct a thorough analysis and revealed a number of very important fraud indicators [32]. 
Moreover, the OECD and Ware, Moss and Campos put forward some of the most common types 
of corruption (e.g. kickbacks, bid rigging and use of shell companies) and then presented a 
selection of indicators, which could be used to confirm corruption [33], [34]. What is more, in 
2010, the World Bank issued a guide on the top 10 most common indicators of fraud and 
corruption in procurement for bank-supported projects. This list was, once again, was confirmed 
by anecdotal proof provided by investigated cases of fraud and corruption within the public and 
also the private sector. Extra sources of information are theoretical models and expert opinions on 
the probable symptoms of corruption [29]. Finally, a study of Transparency International on 
corruption within the sphere of public procurement in Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Pakistan identified and clustered the indicators of corruption on the general public 
procurement cycle [12]. Similarly, Ware, Moss and Campos distinguished the subsequent 
procurement stages and on that corruption indicators may be classified as follows: first, project 
identification and design; then advertising, prequalification, bid preparation and submission; third 
bid analysis, post qualification and award of contract; and finally contract performance, 
administration and superintendence [34]. The corruption indicators that are going to be used in 
this thesis and are described in the subsequent sections will be organized on these lines of the 
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overall public procurement technique to assess with higher accuracy the risks of corruption in 
every stage of the acquisition method. 
In the literature on corruption indicators there are common ideas that come through. First is that, 
the indicators can be divided into three stages of the process: submission, assessment and 
delivery phase. Secondly, there is an understanding of the most common indicators and the 
author will highlight the constantly brought out. The most important indicator that had many 
mentions – single bidding. Whether a tender only got a single bid, or during the assessment phase 
a single bid was left on the table. The most common indicators of corruption in the literature the 
author will now highlight and divide them into phases [19]–[21], [39]–[41], [76].  
• In the submission phase of public procurement:  
o Single bidder contract;  
o Call for tender not published in official journal;  
o Procedure type;  
o Relative length of eligibility criteria;  
o Length of submission;  
o Relative price of tender documentation; 
o  Call or tenders modification;  
• In the assessment phase the common indicators were:  
o Exclusion of all but one bid; 
o Weight of non-price evaluation criteria; 
o Annulled procedure re-launched subsequently; 
o Length of decision period; 
• In the delivery phase of the public procurement process:  
o Contract modification;  
o Contract lengthening; 
o Contract value increase. 
Also, there is research that does not look at machine learning, but using panel data, which 
presents measurements over time, like Frechette [77] and Elbahnasawy with Revier [78]. The 
latter estimate in their paper a random effects model that includes the effects of corruption 
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determinants that change over time and also those that are time-invariant. Elbahnasawy and 
Revier use a larger panel dataset and a comprehensive set of corruption determinants [78]. 
As this thesis uses data mining and machine learning, it is vital to seek out related literature on 
this particular topic. One of the most influential works on data mining has been done by the 
DIGIWHIST project [19], [79]. They use available open data on public procurement and crawl 
for data on websites that manage tender offers. This means that they have a lot of data and have 
established ground indicators to say, whether the business environment in a country is prone to 
corruption or not.  In their work they have brought out 14 new indicators that are classified under: 
integrity, administrative and transparency. These show how the region is doing in each of these 
fields. The author of the thesis will use the same data, only on Estonia, which has been brought 
out in the DIGIWHIST project and is published on Open Tenders website. In order to provide 
deeper analysis the author will improve the dataset by looking at confirmed corrupt cases through 
court documents and will suggest new features as indicators that might improve the future 
projections.  
Furthermore, there has been an increase in looking towards data in fighting against corruption 
and the people at DIGIWHIST are not the only ones. There are many studies that have used data 
to discover unknown patterns in corruption. For example, Fazekas [19]–[21] looks in their work 
at the public procurement data in Hungary. There are also publications by the European 
Commission and other authors that all have aspects in common. Carvalho, Ladeira et. al  [80] 
present a case study of machine learning applied to measure the risk of corruption of civil 
servants using political party affiliation data.  Similarly Olsen, Reynolds and Koltsev [81] discuss 
how data analytics can be put to use next to qualitative statistics. López-Iturriaga and Sanz [82] 
use neural networks to predict public corruption on the basis of Spanish provinces. In their work 
they use a neural network approach to develop an early warning system, specifically self-
organizing maps, which is used for predicting public corruption based on economic and political 
factors. In their findings they present that the aspects that seem to induce public corruption are: 
the taxation of real estate, economic growth, the increase in real estate prices, the growing 
number of deposit institutions and nonfinancial firms, and the same political party remaining in 
power for long periods [82].   
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Corvino et al. [72] question in their research the validity of corruption perception indexes. In 
order to overcome these limitations they provide big data on cross-country news flow indices of 
corruption and anti-corruption. They achieve this by running country-specific search algorithms 
for over more than 665 million international news articles. They find in their research that news 
flow indices of corruption shocks appear to negatively impact both financial (e.g., stock market 
returns and yield spreads) and real variables (e.g., growth), although there is some country 
heterogeneity [72]. Sales [22] uses credit scoring to predict fulfillment of public procurement 
tender offers in Brazil.  
Published works on the importance of data analytics in corruption detection has been increasing. 
The main indicators have been developed and now it is necessary to put this research into models 
and use it for future predictions.  
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4.METHODOLOGY  
In the following section the author will cover the methodology of the thesis. The author will go 
through the following topics: the goal of the thesis, research questions, data and the implemented 
research method.  
4.1. Research goals  
The main goal of this thesis is to find out, whether using open data resources and data analytics it 
is possible to predict corruption in the public procurement processes and therefore suggest a 
suitable set of data to make the detection of corruption easier and quicker.  
In order to achieve this, the author will conduct empirical analysis and will investigate, if it is 
possible to detect corruption using data analytics. The goal of the thesis will be achieved by 
building a model to estimate the probability of corruption.  In order to validate the results from 
data analysis, it will be compared against the findings in published related work.  
In order to achieve the set goal of the thesis, the author has established several research questions: 
• Relying on the theoretical findings, explain the essence of corruption in public 
procurement;  
• Give an overview of the various implications of corruption in public procurement;  
• Present an overview of the state of data in open source data in regards to public 
procurement in Estonia;  
• Develop an applicable solution to analyse the open source data, to assess and visualize 
the results; 
• Validate the results from the analysis by comparing them to the related work;  
• Suggest ways to improve the state of public procurement corruption in Estonia.  
 
The established goals are highlighting the available option to use open source data to root out 
corruption in the public procurement processes. There is lots of data available, which could be 
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put to use with the help of proper data analysis tools and methods. Using these solutions it could 
be possible to find indicators of corruption, which could be implied to the prevention of these 
acts.  
4.2. Flow of the thesis 
The author structures the process of this thesis into a workflow diagram. The purpose of this is to 
develop the understanding of the analysis process and actions taken to achieve the goal of the 
thesis.  The steps of the process are as follows:  
• Problem statement; 
• The collection of proper data;  
• Data preparation; 
• Machine learning model creation;  
• Model training;  
• Evaluation;  
• Hyperparameter tuning; 
• Prediction; 
• Results analysis and discussion. 
 
Figure 2. Workflow of the thesis, compiled by author 
 
In the figure (see Figure 2) above, the main tasks have been brought out to highlight the flow of 
the thesis. The whole process started with identifying the research problem and question. Then it 
was necessary to set a goal to resolve this issue and in order to do that a plan was designed. After 
Discussion of results 
Visualisation of results 
Application of machine learning approaches 
Data collection 
Data research Data cleaning Data processing  Data queries 
Data selection 
Design and methods 
Research goal 
Reseach question 
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that, the plan was implemented through various steps like data processing, application of machine 
learning approaches and the assessment of results. Based on these findings the author discussed 
possible future research possibilities and how this thesis could be useful in the fight against 
corruption in public procurement.  
4.3. Data description 
In the thesis the author used quantitative analysis method. Based on this suitable data collection 
and analysis methods were chosen. The quantitative analysis methods focus on measuring the 
objects under observations through datasets [83]. Quantitative methods in corruption research 
allow us to grasp a wider narrative of what the connections between the factors of interest looks 
like, understand patterns by looking at large data, and make conclusions on the observable 
patterns. The data analysed in this thesis gives results that might be applicable to other cases and 
could be generalizable under certain circumstances to outside the Estonian public procurement 
data.  Quantitative research is a method to test objective theories through the connections of 
model variables [84].   
In order to achieve the main goal of the thesis author used nonreactive data to perform the 
statistical analysis and data collected from DIGIWHIST project through the Open Tender 
webpage [19].  Nonreactive data can be characterized by the fact that the subjects under 
investigation are not aware of that and therefore the process of data collection does not influence 
the behaviour and thanks to this the open source data is not altered. Nonreactive data collection is 
said to be an unseen, hidden, natural or non-intrusive action that takes place in the natural process 
of data gathering. Nonreactive data can be classified into three categories: physical evidence or 
data, observational and archived data that gather in an non-intrusive way [85].  Combining 
nonreactive with other kinds of data collected to pursue the same goal is a way to increase the 
validity of the results. One of the positive aspects of nonreactive data is the fact that their online 
easy access gives the opportunity to collect and analyse large amounts of data at once. Further 
supporting aspects of nonreactive data can be their certainty, trustworthiness, cheapness and 
longevity. On the other hand the lack of control and background information can be a negative 
side of nonreactive data [85]. Nonreactive data collection methods can be classified into two 
sections – usual observation and automated. The usual observation in its essence is data 
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collection without any alterations by the researcher and the data used has already been archived. 
In the automated methods the data collection happens automatically and in order to provide 
objectivity, it already gathers large amount of data at fine detail [85].  
In this thesis the author uses automated data collected by the DIGIWHIST project team that uses 
the DIGIWHIST data processing system. This system detects, when an act of public procurement 
process starts, then it triggers a chain of procedures that leads to the incorporation of the data 
included in this publication into a final database. In order to achieve this a set of so-called source 
crawlers were implemented by the project. Each crawler draws upon the combined knowledge of 
DIGIWHIST public procurement experts and developers, gained through a detailed inspection of 
the source [79]. The author utilizes the work by DIGIWHIST project and uses gathered data 
about Estonia.  
In this thesis the author uses supervised machine-learning methods to analyse the data about 
public procurement processes in Estonia, for that a ground truth of the dataset must be 
established. In machine learning, the term ground truth refers to the accuracy of the training set's 
classification for supervised learning techniques. Ground truth is used in statistical models to 
prove or disprove research hypotheses. The term "ground truth" refers to the process of gathering 
the proper objective (provable) data for this test, it can be compared with gold standard. The data 
contains variables that describe the public tenders, but it does not say, which of them have been 
corrupt. In order to have a sense of direction, the author collaborated with various governmental 
agencies to obtain knowledge of corrupt public tenders that have taken place in Estonia over the 
analysed time period.  Working through hundreds of court documents, the author was able to 
compile a list of confirmed corruption cases and establish a ground truth for running supervised 
machine learning [86].  
The initial data set comes from the project DIGIWHIST and has been developed by others. In this 
thesis the author decided to go for this data set, because it coincided with the same data that the 
author planned to use from the beginning. This is a unique database describing public 
procurements and buyers’ practices across the whole of Europe. It contains detailed information 
(up to 119 variables) covering the whole life cycle for both above- and below-threshold tenders. 
It combines all available publications related to a given tender, links them to company and budget 
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databases using complex algorithms and applies various business rules to create one single 
representative for each tender and subject. [79] 
In the case of Estonia the data source is Public Procurement Registry (PPR) webpage that is an e-
governance site for public procurements in Estonia [43]. The data was obtained by DIGIWHIST 
project and then downloaded by the author. The data comes from an HTML web portal, which 
contains a search form. The search form allows to search by publication data and each notice 
appears in a search results for each day, when it was published or modified. The result HTML 
page contains paged list of publication, as each page allows the user to click on a next page link. 
If this link had been disabled the end of a list is reached and there is nothing further for the 
program to crawl. The maximum amount number of search results is 500, which the crawler 
developed by DIGIWHIST did not reach on a daily basis [79].  
From all the data published the DIGIWHIST project processed all publications from the source 
by type [79]:  
• First there is contract notice, which gives general information about the initial publication 
made;  
• Secondly, contract award, which gives information about the initial offers made;  
• Third, prior information notice, which gives data about various altrecations to the 
procurement;   
• Last, contract implementation, which gives data about the actual results of the 
procurement process.  
The grouping of all tender publications describing the same public procurement together has been 
based on the tender ID, which the author used to link the court documents to the dataset to 
established the ground truth for supervised learning models. A backup strategy was also 
developed and it was based on matches of URLs of related publications, which was useful on 
certain occasions.  
The data set is from 2009 till May 2019. The years prior to that have not been included, since the 
format differs and many variables are missing. As the data is constantly updated, it means that the 
results of this thesis can be implicated in the future. The data consists of 212225 observations 
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among 119 variables. This is the initial data that was obtained from OpenTenders website. The 
author added manually an output variable - tender_isCorrupt - in order to perform supervised 
machine learning.   
The actual data used in this thesis ranges from year 2009 till 2015, which consists of 104414 
observations of 119 input variables and one output variable – tender_isCorrupt. The choice of this 
year range has been made, due to the fact that on these years there have been confirmed court 
cases, which have been added to the dataset by the author. Corrupt acts taking place now will be 
taken to court in two to three years, so that is why there is the delay in data and the latest 
procurements are not included in the analysis. The author was able to match 50 observations with 
court cases from the data [86]. The information about corrupt cases was obtained in collaboration 
with governmental agencies. These observations present only the cases that were publicly 
available and in which the procurement numbers were not hidden. Due to this fact the author was 
not able to link all court cases that were found to the dataset, as the author could not verify the 
procurement numbers one hundred per cent.  
The features of the dataset can be classified as follows:  
• 73 features about the initial tender offer;  
• 9 features about the buyer;  
• 21 features about the lot;  
• 9 features about the bid;  
• 7 features about the bidder. 
In order to get a better understanding of the data, it is important to visualise descriptive statistics 
(refer to Appendix 4). Therefore, the author will bring out key statistics in the initial data. In the 
initial data there are 55 character, 35 integer, 21 logical and 9 numeric features. There are 21 
features that are totally empty, which include for example features like tender award deadline and 
tender contract signature date. This is unfortunate, because these could be beneficial to the 
analysis of the thesis, as the features could say something further about the time aspect of the 
tender. After removing features with unique ID, empty and duplicate columns, the number of 
features left in the dataset was 88. So, there are 88 variables that have been derived from the 
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initial data, which do not have empty values and duplicated. This leaves 52 character, 31 integer 
and 5 numeric features.  
4.4. Research approaches  
To achieve the main goal of this thesis, the author uses data mining and machine learning to 
detect corruption within public procurement in Estonia. Data mining can be defined as the 
process of discovering common patterns in data. Machine learning is a form of artificial 
intelligence that enables computers to learn without being explicitly programmed [48]. In this 
thesis the author will use supervised machine learning to detect corruption. In supervised learning 
the labels have been manually assigned, so it can predicted, whether an tender will be corrupt or 
not [87]. It’s especially good at recognizing patterns and spotting anomalies in data. Fraudulent 
and legitimate transactions have different characteristics. Algorithms are created based on those 
differences to predict the likelihood of fraud. In this thesis, the techniques that have been 
prioritized allow to explain how decisions are made. The goal of this thesis is to know why and 
how corruption is happening, so the choice has been made on the following approaches and they 
have been blended together to provide a probabilistic result that will indicate corruption.   
Firstly, there is logistic regression. This statistical technique uses an algorithm to compare 
already existing procurement processes in order to predict the likelihood of whether a new tender 
will be either corrupted or not. Secondly, there is decision tree. Decision trees are used in order to 
automate the creation of rules for classification tasks. They are trained using examples of 
corruption that have been established in the initial research of the thesis by going through public 
court records. The tree can be used to understand why the next tender could be corrupt based on 
following the list of rules triggered by a certain tender offer [48].  
Thirdly, there is random forest. This technique uses multiple decision trees to improve 
classification performance. It is useful in order to allow the smoothing of the error, which might 
exist in a single tree, increasing our overall performance and accuracy while maintaining our 
ability to explain the results to users [26]. Lastly, the author will use XGBoost. XGBoost 
attempts to mimic how the human brain learns, particularly in pattern recognition. They are 
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trained on legitimate patterns and are therefore adept at flagging fraudulent ones. It complements 
other techniques and improves with exposure to data [28], [87].  
Machine learning is not a silver bullet for corruption detection and prevention. For machine 
learning models to become accurate, it takes a significant amount of data. For some datasets, it is 
useful to apply a basic set of initial rules and allow the models to ‘warm up’ with more data.  
Machines have become much better at dealing with large datasets than we are, although there are 
limitations to machine learning. They can recognize thousands of features from tender’s initial 
publication to the end of the procurement.  Machine learning can see deep into the data and make 
concrete predictions. In large datasets, machine-learning approaches get even better. [23], [48], 
[52], [88] 
4.5. Data cleaning and processing 
Data cleaning is vital, when it comes to the accuracy of predictions. Understanding and pre-
processing the data into a state, where it is possible to analyse and predict accurately is a 
thorough process [89].  Filtering and cleaning the data of the parts that are not beneficial towards 
the goal of the analysis is important, as it helps to train the model easily and will give more 
accurate results [90], [91]. 
In this thesis the author started the data pre-processing with removing missing values by taking 
out totally empty columns. Then, the author removed unique variables, like row number, tender 
id, title etc., as these variables do not give any value to the modelling. However bidder IDs, 
physical locations, addresses are kept as factorials because a possible pattern might be revealed in 
a certain geographical location, bidder or otherwise 'unique' factorial. Secondly, the author 
removed all columns from analysis with less than 5 per cent filled data (all string variables, 
leaving us with 65 variables of which 40 are numerical). Thirdly, variables, which are dates, were 
removed, since the dataset already consists of variables like tender_estimatedDurationInMonths 
and tender_estimatedDurationInDays. So, it was not necessary to duplicate these. Likewise to 
variables with dates, the author removed variables for all prices brought out separate in euros, for 
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example tender_priceEUR. The reason for that is that glimpsing at the data, it is clear the data is 
duplicated across the dataset.  
After the cleaning process, the NAs were counted. The highest number of NAs was in variable 
tender_estimatedPrice with 97 787 NAs, which means that only 6,35 % of data was filled. As this 
amount of data is not reasonable to impute, because the number of NAs is higher than the amount 
filled data, the author decided to remove variables, which have more than seventy thousand 
missing values. This left a dataset of 104 141 observations for 21 input variables and 1 output 
variable. Then the data was imputed using MICE package, where the missing values are replaced 
with predicted values. For example, if there is a number of variables X1, X2 to Xn. Then lets 
assume that X1 has missing values, so it will be computed on variables X2 to Xn. The NA values 
of X1 will be replaced by predictive values gathered.  
Then after imputing the dataset was balanced. The author used ROSE package and combination 
of over- and under-sampling, respectively. The reason is that using both over- and under- 
sampling increases the recall of the prediction model and this is the most important metric in this 
thesis, as it is necessary to minimize the number of false negatives [92]. Before starting with the 
training of the model, it is important to make sure that all of the input variables are either numeric 
or factors [93]. This is necessary, because the approaches used in this thesis require it [51]. The 
last step in the data pre-processing before modelling was scaling of the dataset, also known as 
data normalisation. Data normalisation is important, because data can consist of observations that 
vary highly in magnitudes. Since most of machine learning approaches use Eucledian distance 
between two data points for calculation, non-scaled data is a problem [94], [95].  
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Figure 3. Data pre-processing steps, compiled by author 
In the figure above the steps are presented graphically. After these steps the author was able to 
start with the modelling of the machine learning approaches.  
4.6. Model building 
In machine learning it is necessary to train the model for prediction. As described in section 4.4 
the author uses logistic regression, decision tree, random forest and XGBoost machine learning 
approaches to estimate the probability of corruption in public procurement in Estonia. The 
reasoning behind the choice of approaches is that aforementioned techniques are classic 
approaches that have been found to give good results and have quality [26], [55], [56], [59], [48]. 
For example, in their study Lessman et. al benchmark commonly-known approaches against 
newer methods and it is found that these approaches gave very good performances, which can 
note the fact that most credit scoring data sets are only weakly non-linear. Looking at the results 
of their study, it is clear that many classification techniques have shown performances, which are 
quite similar to each other [88]. These methods will be assessed separetely and compared to one 
another, in order to give a better overview of the validity of the results.  
Data	normalisation	
Features	as	numeric	or	factor	
Data	balancing	
Data	imputing	
Removing	common	NAs	
Removing	cols	with	less	than	5%	
Removing	unnecessary	features	
Cleaning	of	empty	columns	
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The author uses cross-validation in the model building process, specifically stratified k-fold 
cross-validation.  Kohavi expresses in his study of cross-validation for accuracy estimation that 
stratifiied k-fold provides results with the smallest bias and variance, because using this method 
makes it possible to predict on all of the data, rather than doing a simple spilt of 80-20 [96]. Also, 
by using cross-validation it will be possible to get more metrics and understand more about the 
model and the data. For the estimation of predictions the author uses metrics like accuracy, 
precision, recall, F1, Confusion Matrix, Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Square Error (MSE),  
and ROC (refer to section 2.3 and Table 1). These metrics were chosen, as they suit the analysis 
of predicting corruption in public procurement [61], [62].  
The coding of the models (refer to Appendix 2) was based on authors previous knowledge 
obtained in courses regarding R, but the final decisions were based on published materials. For 
example, the choice of number of trees built in Random Forest model was selected at 500 and the 
mtry was set at 5, which is the square root of total features available. These decisions were based 
on studies conducted on Random Forest [97], [98]. The same applies for the choice of threshold. 
The threshold set in the code is 0.5 and the reason is that this way it makes the probabilities into 
classifications [99]. Guidelines were also used to build Decision Tree and XGBoost models [59], 
[100]. In order to assess the importance of features the author also built models with only top ten 
most important features. This gives indication on the valuable features that should become the 
focus points of future analysis.  
In the upcoming section the author will discuss the final data that was used for analysis and will 
go over the main results. 
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5. RESULTS  
In this section the author will cover the main results of the analysis and will present possible 
suggestions for imporvement in the future on this particular topic.  
5.1. Final data 
The initial data of 104414 observations, 119 input and one output variable were cleaned from 
empty columns, values. Then it was pre-processed for analysis. After the application of these 
methods the data that the machine learning models were built on consisted of:  
• 104 414 observations; 
• 21 input variables; 
• 1 output variable. 
The data was imputed and scaled. In order to understand the final dataset, the author will bring 
out key descriptive statistics (refer to Appendix 3).   
5.2. Visualisations of results 
The data was analysed through R software and after cleaning, pre-processing, model building the 
results were gathered and will be presented in this section. The following Table 2 presents the 
main results of the machine learning approaches.  
 
 
Table 2. Results of the analysis, compiled by author 
Metrics 
Models 
CONFUSION MATRIX OTHER METRICS 
Accuracy 
 
Sensitivity 
 
Specificity R2 MAE RMSE Recall Precision F1 AUC 
GLM 
0.7457 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7195 
 
0.2417001 
 
0.2543217 
 
0.5043032 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7370 
 
0.7537 
 
0.745 
 
GLM_CV* 
0.7457 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7195 
 
0.2417001 
 
0.2543217 
 
0.5043032 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7370 
 
0.7537 
 
0.745 
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* CV refers to Cross-Validation  
** F refers to model with only top10 features 
 
Table 2 contains abbreviations of machine learning models:  
• GLM refers to Logistic Regression;  
• DT refers to Decision Tree;  
• RF refers to Random Forest;  
• And XGB refers to XGBoost.  
As it can be seen from Table 2, the author has not used Cross-Validation for Random Forest and 
XGBoost. The reason behind not using Cross-Validation in Random Forest, is that multiple 
GLM _F** 
0.7457 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7195 
 
0.2417001 
 
0.2543217 
 
0.5043032 
 
0.7713 
 
0.7370 
 
0.7537 
 
0.745 
 
GLM CV_F 
0.6866 
 
0.9909 
 
0.3765 
 
0.2182904 
 
0.3134128 
 
0.5598329 
 
0.9908 
 
0.6182 
 
0.7614 
 
0.684 
 
DT 
0.9675 
 
0.9357 
 
1.0000 
 
0.878112 
 
0.0324666 
 
0.1801849 
 
0.9356 
 
1 
 
0.9667 
 
0.985 
 
DT_CV 
0.7544 
 
0.9201 
 
0.5855 
 
0.2889138 
 
0.2456065 
 
0.495587 
 
0.9201 
 
0.6934 
 
0.7908 
 
0.768 
 
DT_F 
0.949 
 
0.8989 
 
1.0000 
 
0.8148764 
 
0.05104631 
 
0.2259343 
 
0.8988 
 
1 
 
0.9467 
 
0.981 
 
DT_CV_F 
0.6912 
 
1.0000 
 
0.3765 
 
0.2335728 
 
0.3088158 
 
0.555712 
 
1 
 
0.6204 
 
0.7657 
 
0.751 
 
RF 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
RF_F 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
XGB 
0.9997 
 
0.9994 
 
1.0000 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.9997 
 
1 
 
0.9994 
 
1 
 
XGB_F 
0.9994 
 
0.9988 
 
1.0000 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.9987 
 
1 
 
0.99938 
 
1 
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bagging in the process of training Random Forest should prevent the model from over-fitting 
[56]. For XGBoost the initial model already uses Cross-Validation (refer to Appendix 2).  
The results show that the best model for public procurement corruption prediction in Estonia is 
Random Forest, as the model has accuracy rating of 1. Great results apply to the other metrics as 
well, which makes Random Forest the best model in current dataset for predicting corruption in 
public procurement in Estonia. However, it seems that this model might be overfitting the data. 
This means that the results of the analysis is too close or in this case exact to the data, and 
therefore might fail to predict future observations reliably. Even though, research has shown that 
Random Forest models do not overfit, the author has reservations and this would require further 
analysis [56], [97].  
The effect of cross-validation is also clear, but since the models are still predicting well, it can be 
said that the predictions are valid. The results vary for both Logistic Regression and Decision 
Tree. Cross-validation provides certainty of stability that this data is useful in predicting future 
values on chosen models [96]. The results of Logistic Regression (LR) and Decision Tree (DT) 
models are also good, with accuracy ratings of 0.7457 for LR and 0.9675 for DT. In the case of 
LR cross-validation does not alter the outcome, but for DT the accuracy decreases to 0.7544, 
which is also not a bad result.  
The worst results come from Logistic Regression model with cross-validation and only top ten 
important metrics. In this case the accuracy is just 0.6866. On the other hand, the model comes 
with high recall of 0.9908 and lower precision of 0.6182. It was established earlier in the thesis 
that achieving high recall in the predictions is important, as it minimizes false negatives. This 
means that there is lower possibility of not discovering actually corrupt cases. In Figure 4 the 
AUC (Area Under the Curve) of receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) is presented. This 
plot shows the ability of a binary classifier system to predict at various threshold settings [60]. 
The best in this metric are Random Forest and XGBoost with AUC rating of 1. This means that 
the model is very good at distinguishing between positive and negative classes.  
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Figure 4. AUC for all models with all features, compiled by author, source: Appendix 2 	
In order to understand the value of various features, the author plotted their ranking according to 
importance. These results can be seen in Figure 5, where it depicts that 
tender_economicRequirements_length has the highest importance with a rating of over 0.2 and 
the least important feature is tender_indicator_ INTEGRITY_DECISION PERIOD.  
The author also compiled models based on the ten most important input features:  
• tender_finalPrice;  
• bid_price;  
• lot_bidsCount;  
• tender_economicRequirements_length;  
• tender_description_length;  
• tender_personalRequirements_length;  
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• tender_technicalRequirements_length;  
• tender_lots_count; 
•  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID; 
• tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE. 
 
Figure 5. Features ranked by importance, compiled by author, source: Appendix 2 
This feature-based analysis was conducted in order understand, how much do certain features 
matter in the prediction results. The models with only ten most important features were analysed 
and the results can be see from Table 2. Once again the best performing machine learning 
approach on this dataset is Random Forest, with same metric ratings as the prediction of all the 
features. In this part of the analysis the worst ranking approach according to accuracy is Logistic 
Regression with cross-validation. The accuracy of this model is 0.6866, but it must be pointed out 
that recall metrics is as high as 0.9908. This could mean that the model is still good to predict the 
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outcomes and it minimizes the likelihood of false negatives. Figure 6 shows the AUC of all the 
analysed approaches with ten most important features selected in the dataset.  
 
Figure 6. AUC of models with Top10 features, compiled by author, source: Appendix 2 
The analysis shows that these models are good at predicting the outcome of classifying 
corruption in public procurement. The modelling with top ten features shows that even using a 
smaller sample of features it is possible to predict corruption on this data with relative accuracy 
and good results.  
In the following sub-section the author will discuss and evaluate the results further and how they 
could be put to use in the future.  
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5.3. Evaluation   
Data is influencing our everyday actions and it has been put to great use in private and public 
enterprises [101]. At first it was seen as an extra cost that the companies had to endure, but it has 
transformed how businesses are run nowadays [102].  
As the related work suggests, it might be possible to predict corruption with the right features and 
indicators [19]–[21], [80]. This thesis shows that it is true. The results of the analysis depict that 
machine learning approaches are capable of classifying non- and corrupt acts based on public 
procurement data. Using a data analytics it is possible to predict corruption on the given dataset.  
The results show that the approaches are capable of classifying a tender as non – or corrupt with 
an accuracy of 74,44 % to 100 %. The possibility of treating a corrupt act as non-corrupt in the 
predictions is minimised, as the recall of the analysis for various approaches ranges from 78,01 % 
to 100%. The RMSE and MAE in Table 2 show that the error rate is low in the analysis and MAE 
is mostly lower with the exception of Random Forest, where both metrics are equal to zero.  
The results show that there are certain indicators that matter most, when there is a risk of 
corruption, for example; the final price of the tender, the actual price of the bid, the indicator of 
whether it was a single bid or not and the estimated time of tender duration. The important 
features that have turned up in the analysis, have been brought out in related work as potential 
indicators of corruption [20], [39], [44]–[47], [103]. This certifies the validity of the analysis, 
which comes to similar conclusions and presents features that have been also highlighted in other 
papers. The fact that the length of requirements (personal, economical or technical) is important 
is another aspect that has been previously brought out in multiple studies and validates the 
analysis of this thesis. This refers to the problem that tender offers are sometimes orchestrated in 
order to fulfil certain requirements of a particular buyer. It is clear that this thesis present valuable 
results that can be taken forward. Previously worked out indicators have proven to be important 
and based on public procurement data it is possible to predict corruption.  
However, this thesis has some drawbacks. First is the completeness and imbalance of the data. 
After conducting the analysis it is clear that a lot of initial data is missing from the database. On 
the other hand, it is vital that this database exists, as gathering information about Estonia is not 
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possible from anywhere else as a set. Having worked together with governmental agencies 
throughout the process of this thesis, it is evident that getting wholesome data is not possible 
otherwise. The data used is from the Estonian business registry can become better. Still, the fact 
that it has become more open over the years is crucial, but steps need to be taken for it to be more 
useful.  
Second drawback of this thesis is the overfitting of some machine learning approaches. In the 
author’s opinion Random Forest and XGBoost models might be overfitting the data, which 
creates very accurate, but not usable results. This could come from the high imputation level of 
the data or from the necessity of removing many features. On the other hand, the author provides 
cross-validated approaches like Logistic Regression and Decision Tree that also show that based 
on this data predicting corruption is fairly accurate and with low recall, which suits the context of 
this thesis.  
In order to validate further, this research needs to be applied to future datasets with certified 
controls to give in a fair assessment.  
5.4. Suggestions   
In this sub-section the author will give recommendations on the subjects of machine learning 
approaches, features and data quality for more efficient corruption detection and prediction.  
5.4.1 Feature selection 
In the previous sub-section the author cover the main results of the analysis. These results show 
that there are features that are more important than others, which is supported by related work. In 
addition to the most important features the author will bring out relevant indicators could be used 
in the analysis of predicting corruption in Estonia, since the data is available. Looking at the 
information available in tender documents and on the Public Procurement Registry (PPR) website 
[43], the author makes the following suggestions:  
• Add a feature about tender award criteria weights; 
• Add a feature about automatic and non-automatic evaluation;  
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• Add a feature that evaluates the length of criteria on suitability;  
• Add a feature that evaluates the length of grounds of exclusion criteria; 
• Focus on features that have been highlighted as important in section 5.3.  
All of these aforementioned features are available on the PPR website, but due to some reason 
they were not crawled into this dataset. These features could turn out to be very important, since 
the weights assigned to each criteria is a key decision point in awarding public procurements. The 
potential of this feature has also been brought out in related work, which supports this idea 
further.  Also, it could be interesting to see, if the automation of evaluation plays a role in 
corruption. Furthermore, the author believes that the focus should be on the most important 
features and perhaps these could even be highlighted on the PPR website to provide further 
certainty and transparency. Bringing out certain data to the companies, public offices using this 
website, might make them more aware of the problem, which could help eradicate the problem in 
the first place.  
5.4.2 Data quality 
Data quality is always a question that must be addressed. As it was visible from the section of 
data cleaning and pre-processing, a lot of effort went into making this dataset suitable for data 
analysis. The number of missing data was very high and although some of the data comes from 
almost a decade ago, there should be efforts going into keeping a certain standard of data 
completeness. Based on this, the author makes following suggestions:  
• Setting a standard to make sure that necessary information is always present in the 
database;  
• Create a plan for utilising the possibilities of open data.  
5.4.3 Machine learning approaches 
In this thesis the author has used four machine learning approaches to evaluate the data. These 
were: Logistic Regression, Random Forest, Decison Tree and XGBoost. All of these have their 
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strengths and weaknesses, which must be taken into account. Based on past and current 
experience the author make the following suggestions:  
• Use cross-validation to provide stability to the results;  
• Apply each model separately and then combine to give a deeper understanding of the 
results;  
• Use k-nn, SVM or other methods also to build the predictions.  
The reason, why the author suggests using also other methods, is that in this thesis they were not 
sought after and it could be interesting to see in further research how these approaches compare 
to the ones currently used.  
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CONCLUSION  
The main goal of this thesis was to assess, whether using open data resources and data analytics it 
is possible to predict corruption in the public procurement processes and therefore suggest a 
suitable set of data to make the detection of corruption easier and quicker. 
In the theoretical part of the thesis the author gave an overview of the causes, effects of 
corruption and how public procurement is influenced by corruption. The high risk of corruption 
in public procurement has been brought out in various studies in Europe and all over the world. 
The qualitative aspects of these papers have developed an understanding why corruption takes 
place and how does it influence the society. However, there has been little research conducted on 
actually quantifying the possibility of corruption.  
In the practical part of the thesis the author conducted data analytics on public procurement data 
in Estonia. The data comes from open sources and this means that the results could be implicated 
on other regions, as already this particular source has information on 32 other countries. In order 
to accomplish the main goal of the thesis the author applied machine learning approaches to 
predict corruption. The author believes that there are suitable data analytical approaches and 
capabilities available to quantify the problem of corruption, but the public offices need to take 
matters into their own hands and either use the data or pawn it off to the private sector, so that it 
turned into value. This means that in the fight against corruption the importance of open data has 
been undervalued.  
Based on theoretical background and practical research the author was able to accomplish the set 
goal of the thesis.  
The main results of this thesis are:  
• The author has provided an overview of the state of corruption in public procurement;  
• Through analysis the author has shown the potential of data analytics in corruption 
detection;  
• The author has provided suggestions on how to improve;  
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• The author has developed an approach that can predict corruption well.  
Data can be the game changer, when it comes to fighting corruption, as it will give a deeper 
insight into the complex paradigm that it is. Corruption can coexist with strong economic 
performance, but the research suggests that in the long run it is harmful for development, as it can 
be found in bureaucratic and political institutions. This harm can be eased using data analysis and 
understanding the weak points in the governance or laws that have been exploited by 
businessmen and politicians. The main problem is systemic corruption that has been ingrained in 
institutions, behaviours, and the habits of elites against the common good.  
Using data analytics, the assessment of corruption can be made easier and faster. Next to 
qualitative research and work done to prevent corruption in the first place, data analytics can be 
of help, as people are always running plots against the system and there are various ways of 
hiding it. The author believes that there is huge potential in using data analytics in corruption 
detection. It is wrong to assume that these applications will start convicting people of corruption, 
but it can be assumed that using, analysing and presenting valuable data will help the society in 
assessing corruption and moulding the public opinion.  
In the authors’ opinion there are two possible development paths for the thesis. First, it is possible 
to apply current work it in the context of other countries, if there is necessary data. Following this 
idea, it could be researched how corruption in various countries differs and what are the common 
issues. The second development could be the use of more data, metrics and machine learning 
approaches to develop the analysis that has been done here further.    
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APPENDICES  
Appendix 1  
 
Table 3. Corruption effects, compiled by author, source: [66] 
Author(s)  Impact on  Finding  
Mauro (1996)  Real per capita GDP growth  –0.3 to –1.8 percentage points  
Leite and Weidmann (1999)  Real per capita GDP growth  –0.7 to –1.2 percentage points  
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000)  Real per capita GDP growth  –0.6 percentage points  
Abed and Davoodi (2000)  Real per capita GDP growth  –1 to –1.3 percentage points  
Mauro (1996)  Ratio of investment to GDP  –1 to –2.8 percentage points  
Mauro (1998) Ratio of public education spending to 
GDP  
–0.7 to –0.9 percentage points  
Mauro (1998) Ratio of public health spending to GDP  –0.6 to –1.7 percentage points  
Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 
(1998)  
Income inequality (Gini coefficient)  +0.9 to +2.1 Gini points  
Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 
(1998)  
Income growth of the poor  –2 to –10 percentage points  
Ghura (1998)  Ratio of tax revenues to GDP  –1 to –2.9 percentage points  
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) Measures of government revenues to 
GDP ratio  
–0.1 to –4.5 percentage points  
Gupta, de Mello and Sharan (2000)  Ratio of military spending to GDP  +1 percentage point  
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Appendix 2 – R Code 
--- 
output: 
  html_document: default 
  pdf_document: default 
  word_document: default 
--- 
```{r} 
library(dplyr) 
library(ggplot2) 
library(ROSE) # Balancing 
library(pROC) # AUC 
library(reshape) #melt 
library(stringr) # work with strings 
library(rpart) # decision tree 
library(arsenal) #descriptive statistics 
 
library(xgboost) # for xgboost 
library(readr) 
andmed09 <- read.csv("data2009.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed10 <- read.csv("data2010.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed11 <- read.csv("data2011.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed12 <- read.csv("data2012.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed13 <- read.csv("data2013.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed14 <- read.csv("data2014.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
andmed15 <- read.csv("data2015.csv",sep=";", stringsAsFactors=FALSE, fileEncoding="latin1") 
 
 
summary(andmed13) 
``` 
```{r} 
table(sapply(andmed, class)) 
sapply(andmed, function(x) sum(is.na(x))) 
``` 
 
## Not adding data from 2013,as it does not have any corrupt cases 
 
```{r} 
andmed <- rbind(andmed09, andmed10, andmed11, andmed12,andmed14,andmed15) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
# package required printing important features for XGBoost 
#install.packages("Ckmeans.1d.dp") 
library(Ckmeans.1d.dp) 
 
Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 
(2000) 
Child mortality rate  +1.1 to 2.7 deaths per 1,000 live 
births  
Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 
(2000) 
Primary student dropout rate  +1.4 to 4.8 percentage points  
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) Ratio of public investment to GDP  +0.5 percentage points  
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) Per cent of paved roads in good 
condition  
–2.2 to –3.9 percentage points  
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# for confusion matrix 
#install.packages("e1071") 
#install.packages("Rcpp") 
library(e1071) 
library(Rcpp) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#Then install caret 
#install.packages('caret', dependencies=TRUE) 
library(caret) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
emptycols <- sapply(andmed, function (k) all(is.na(k))) 
andmed <- andmed[!emptycols] 
``` 
Removing from the dataset completely unique variables (row nr, id, title, url) because these variables do not improve any modelling. However 
bidder IDs, physical locations, addresses are kept as factorials because a possible pattern might be revealed in a certain geographical location, 
bidder or otherwise 'unique' factorial. 
Secondly remove all columns from analysis with less than 5 percent filled data (all string variables, leaving us with 65 variables of which 40 are 
numerical) 
 
```{r} 
#glimpse(andmed) 
 
# Unique IDs and duplicates removed  
andmed.stripped <- andmed %>% select(-c(tender_year, tender_estimatedPrice_EUR, tender_finalPrice_EUR, bid_price_EUR, 
lot_estimatedPrice_EUR,tender_row_nr, tender_id, tender_title, tender_publications_lastContractAwardUrl, bidder_row_nr, 
tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_ELECTRONIC_AUCTION)) 
# Dates 
andmed.nodate <- andmed.stripped %>% select(-contains("Date")) 
# Poorly filled data (<5%) 
removed.cols <- andmed.nodate[, -which(colMeans(is.na(andmed.nodate)) > 0.95)] 
#View(removed.cols) 
 
andmed.nodate <- andmed.nodate[, -which(colMeans(is.na(andmed.nodate)) > 0.95)]  
filter(andmed.nodate, rowSums(!is.na(andmed)) > 45 | tender_isCorrupt == 'yes') %>%# visualise positive controls, filtering for at least 50% of 
columns filled in a single row and all positive  rows regardless of % of NA values. 
  count(tender_isCorrupt == 'yes') %>% 
  glimpse # count number of positive controls  
 
# Mutate the isCorrupt data to a boolean 
andmed.final <- andmed.nodate %>% 
  mutate(tender_isCorrupt = ifelse(tender_isCorrupt == "no",0,1)) 
 
andmed.final$tender_mainCpv = as.factor(andmed.final$tender_mainCpv) 
andmed.final$buyer_row_nr = as.factor(andmed.final$buyer_row_nr) 
andmed.final$buyer_postcode = as.factor(andmed.final$buyer_postcode) 
andmed.final <- andmed.final[,sapply(andmed.final, is.numeric)] 
``` 
 
```{r} 
table(sapply(andmed.stripped, class)) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
count(andmed.final, is.na(andmed.final$tender_finalPrice)) 
summary(andmed.final) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
count(andmed.final, is.na(andmed.final$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID)) 
``` 
## Filtering out the rows with more than 70 000 NAs  
```{r} 
dt <- andmed.final %>% 
  select(-c(tender_estimatedDurationInMonths, tender_estimatedPrice,tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_TAX_HAVEN, 
tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_ENGLISH_AS_FOREIGN_LANGUAGE, lot_estimatedPrice,lot_description_length)) 
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count(dt, is.na(dt$tender_finalPrice)) 
summary(dt) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
library(Hmisc) 
Hmisc::describe(dt) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
library(mice) 
library(VIM) 
aggr_plot <- aggr(dt, col=c('navyblue','red'), numbers=TRUE, sortVars=TRUE, labels=names(dt), cex.axis=.7, gap=3, ylab=c("Histogram of 
missing data","Pattern")) 
dt_imputed<- mice(dt, m=5, method='cart', printFlag=FALSE) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
dt <- complete(dt_imputed, 1) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
summary(dt) 
library(Hmisc) 
Hmisc::describe(dt) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
dt_b <- ovun.sample(tender_isCorrupt~. , data = dt, method = "both",  
                                   p=0.5, seed = 1000)$data 
 
ggplot(dt_b, aes(x = tender_isCorrupt, fill = as.factor(tender_isCorrupt))) + 
    geom_bar() 
``` 
 
```{r} 
dt_b$tender_finalPrice <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_finalPrice) 
dt_b$tender_estimatedDurationInDays <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_estimatedDurationInDays) 
dt_b$tender_description_length <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_description_length) 
dt_b$tender_economicRequirements_length <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_economicRequirements_length) 
dt_b$tender_technicalRequirements_length <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_technicalRequirements_length) 
dt_b$tender_awardCriteria_count <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_awardCriteria_count) 
dt_b$tender_lots_count <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_lots_count) 
dt_b$tender_publications_count <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_publications_count) 
dt_b$lot_row_nr <- as.numeric(dt_b$lot_row_nr) 
dt_b$lot_bidsCount <- as.numeric(dt_b$lot_bidsCount) 
dt_b$bid_row_nr <- as.numeric(dt_b$bid_row_nr) 
dt_b$tender_personalRequirements_length <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_personalRequirements_length) 
dt_b$tender_technicalRequirements_length <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_technicalRequirements_length) 
dt_b$lot_bidsCount <- as.numeric(dt_b$lot_bidsCount) 
 
 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID) 
dt_b$tender_isCorrupt <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_isCorrupt ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_CALL_FOR_TENDER_PUBLICATION <- 
as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_CALL_FOR_TENDER_PUBLICATION ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_ADVERTISEMENT_PERIOD <- 
as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_ADVERTISEMENT_PERIOD ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_COVERED_BY_GPA <- 
as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_COVERED_BY_GPA ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_FRAMEWORK_AGREEMENT <- 
as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_FRAMEWORK_AGREEMENT ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_NOTICE_AND_AWARD_DISCREPANCIES <- 
as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_NOTICE_AND_AWARD_DISCREPANCIES ) 
dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD <- as.numeric(dt_b$tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD ) 
 
``` 
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```{r} 
scaled_df <- dt_b %>%  
    mutate(tender_finalPrice = scale(tender_finalPrice), 
         tender_estimatedDurationInDays = scale(tender_estimatedDurationInDays), 
         tender_description_length = scale(tender_description_length), 
         tender_economicRequirements_length = scale(tender_economicRequirements_length), 
         tender_awardCriteria_count = scale(tender_awardCriteria_count), 
         tender_lots_count = scale(tender_lots_count), 
         tender_publications_count = scale(tender_publications_count), 
         lot_row_nr = scale(lot_row_nr), 
         bid_row_nr = scale(bid_row_nr), 
         bid_price = scale(bid_price), 
         lot_row_nr = scale(lot_row_nr), 
         tender_personalRequirements_length = scale(tender_personalRequirements_length), 
         tender_technicalRequirements_length = scale(tender_technicalRequirements_length), 
         lot_bidsCount = scale(lot_bidsCount), 
         tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_NOTICE_AND_AWARD_DISCREPANCIES = 
scale(tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_NOTICE_AND_AWARD_DISCREPANCIES), 
         tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID = scale(tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID), 
         tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_CALL_FOR_TENDER_PUBLICATION = 
scale(tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_CALL_FOR_TENDER_PUBLICATION), 
         tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_ADVERTISEMENT_PERIOD = scale(tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_ADVERTISEMENT_PERIOD), 
         tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE = scale(tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE), 
         tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_COVERED_BY_GPA = scale(tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_COVERED_BY_GPA), 
         tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_FRAMEWORK_AGREEMENT = 
scale(tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_FRAMEWORK_AGREEMENT), 
         tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD = scale(tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD), 
         ) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
glimpse(scaled_df) 
summary(scaled_df) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(scaled_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(scaled_df)), replace = F) 
train <- scaled_df[samples,] 
test <- scaled_df[-samples,] 
#Logistic Regression 
glm <- glm(tender_isCorrupt ~ ., train, family=gaussian) 
pred_glm_scores <- predict(glm, test) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
glm_predict_boolean <- ifelse(pred_glm_scores >= threshold,1,0) 
 
glm_cm <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(glm_predict_boolean), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
glm_cm 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(glm_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(glm_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(glm_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_glm <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, glm_predict_boolean) 
plot.roc(roc_glm, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM)): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm)), col="orange") 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#GLM with Cross Validation 
set.seed(101) 
# Define train control for k fold cross validation 
train_control <- trainControl(method="cv", number=10, savePredictions = TRUE, classProbs = TRUE) 
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# Fit Linear Regression Model 
modelGLM <- train(tender_isCorrupt~., data=train, trControl=train_control, method="glm") 
# Summarise Results 
print(modelGLM) 
#GLM with Cross Validation 
pred_glm_scores2 <- predict(modelGLM, test) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
glm_predict_boolean2 <- ifelse(pred_glm_scores2 >= threshold,1,0) 
 
glm_cm2 <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(glm_predict_boolean2), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
glm_cm2 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(glm_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(glm_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(glm_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_glm2 <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, glm_predict_boolean2) 
plot.roc(roc_glm2, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM with CV)): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm2)), col="orange") 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#Decision Tree 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(scaled_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(scaled_df)), replace = F) 
train <- scaled_df[samples,] 
test <- scaled_df[-samples,] 
 
tree <- rpart(tender_isCorrupt~., train) 
pred_tree_scores <- predict(tree, test) 
 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
tree_predict_boolean <- ifelse(pred_tree_scores >= threshold,1,0) 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(tree_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(tree_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(tree_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(tree_predict_boolean), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm 
 
print(paste("Recall of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_dt <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, predict(tree, test)) 
plot.roc(roc_dt, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT)): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt)), col="green") 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#Decision Tree with Cross Validation 
set.seed(101) 
# Define train control for k fold cross validation 
train_control <- trainControl(method="cv", number=10, savePredictions = TRUE, classProbs = TRUE) 
# Fit Decision Tree Model 
modelDT <- train(tender_isCorrupt~., data=train, trControl=train_control, method="rpart") 
# Summarise Results 
print(modelDT) 
 
pred_tree_scores2 <- predict(modelDT, test) 
 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
tree_predict_boolean2 <- ifelse(pred_tree_scores2 >= threshold,1,0) 
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data.frame( R2 = R2(tree_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(tree_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(tree_predict_boolean2, test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm2 <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(tree_predict_boolean2), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm2 
 
print(paste("Recall of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2$byClass["F1"])) 
 
 
roc_dt2 <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, predict(modelDT, test)) 
plot.roc(roc_dt2, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT with CV)): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt2)), col="green") 
``` 
 
```{r} 
library(randomForest) 
#Random Forest 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(scaled_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(scaled_df)), replace = F) 
train <- scaled_df[samples,] 
test <- scaled_df[-samples,] 
 
rf <- randomForest(tender_isCorrupt ~ ., train, ntree = 500, mtry = 5, ) 
pred_rf_scores <- predict(rf, test) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
rf_predict_boolean <- ifelse(pred_rf_scores >= threshold,1,0) 
 
rf_cm <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(rf_predict_boolean), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
rf_cm 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(rf_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(rf_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(rf_predict_boolean, test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Random Forest is:", rf_cm$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Random Forest is:", rf_cm$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Random Forest is:", rf_cm$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_rf <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, rf_predict_boolean) 
plot.roc(roc_rf, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(RF)): %0.3f", auc(roc_rf)), col="orange") 
 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#XGBOOST 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(scaled_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(scaled_df)), replace = F) 
train <- scaled_df[samples,] 
test <- scaled_df[-samples,] 
``` 
 
```{r} 
matrix_train <- xgb.DMatrix(as.matrix(train %>% select(-tender_isCorrupt)), label = train$tender_isCorrupt) 
matrix_test <- xgb.DMatrix(as.matrix(test %>% select(-tender_isCorrupt)), label = test$tender_isCorrupt) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
watchlist <- list(train = matrix_train, cv = matrix_test) 
 
params <- list( 
  "objective" = "binary:logitraw", #Specify the learning task and the corresponding learning objective. 
  "eval_metric" = "auc" 
) 
 
model_xgb <- xgb.train(params=params,  
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                       data=matrix_train, 
                       maximize=TRUE, # larger the evaluation score the better 
                       nrounds=50, # max number of boosting iterations 
                       nthread=3, # number of threads 
                       early_stopping_round=10, # stop if the performance doesn't improve for 10 rounds 
                       watchlist = watchlist, # named list of xgb.DMatrix datasets to use for evaluating model performance 
                       print_every_n=5) # prints metrics for every 5th iteration 
``` 
 
### Variable importance 
 
```{r} 
importance <- xgb.importance(colnames(matrix_train), model = model_xgb) 
xgb.ggplot.importance(importance) 
``` 
 
### Ploting AUC 
 
Let's see how AUC changes with next iterations of model training  
 
```{r} 
melted <- melt(model_xgb$evaluation_log, id.vars="iter") 
ggplot(data=melted, aes(x=iter, y=value, group=variable, color = variable)) + geom_line() 
``` 
 
### Prediction 
 
Now let's predict fraud using test data: 
 
```{r} 
xgb_predict_scores <- predict(model_xgb, matrix_test) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
xgb_predict_boolean <- ifelse(xgb_predict_scores >= threshold,1,0) 
``` 
 
And evaluate the result by creating confusion matrix: 
 
```{r} 
xgb_cm <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(xgb_predict_boolean), as.factor(test$tender_isCorrupt)) 
xgb_cm 
``` 
 
We can access different metrics from our confusion matrix. 
 
```{r} 
print(paste("Recall of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm$byClass["F1"])) 
``` 
 
We can also create ROC and find AUC 
 
```{r} 
roc_xgb <- roc(test$tender_isCorrupt, predict(model_xgb, matrix_test, type = "prob")) 
plot.roc(roc_xgb) 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(XGB)): %0.3f", auc(roc_xgb)), col="black") 
``` 
 
## Result 
 
Let's compare all 4 AUC's and select the best one. 
 
```{r} 
plot.roc(roc_glm, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM)): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm)), col="green") 
 
lines(roc_dt, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.33, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT)): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt)), col="orange") 
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lines(roc_xgb, col="black") 
text(0.36, 0.43, labels=sprintf("AUC(XGB): %0.3f", auc(roc_xgb)), col="black")  
 
lines(roc_rf, col="red") 
text(0.36, 0.23, labels=sprintf("AUC(RF): %0.3f", auc(roc_rf)), col="red")  
 
lines(roc_dt2, col="blue") 
text(0.36, 0.13, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT_CV): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt2)), col="blue") 
 
lines(roc_glm2, col="purple") 
text(0.36, 0.03, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM_CV): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm2)), col="purple") 
``` 
 
## Dataset with TOP10 most important features  
 
```{r} 
important_df <- scaled_df %>% 
  select(tender_finalPrice, bid_price, tender_description_length, tender_economicRequirements_length, tender_technicalRequirements_length, 
tender_personalRequirements_length, tender_lots_count, tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID, tender_ indicator_PROCEDURE_TYPE, 
tender_publications_count, tender_isCorrupt) 
``` 
 
#Models with dataset with just important features 
```{r} 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(important_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(important_df)), replace = F) 
train_imp <- important_df[samples,] 
test_imp <- important_df[-samples,] 
#Logistic Regression with Top10 features 
glm_imp <- glm(tender_isCorrupt ~ ., train_imp, family=binomial) 
pred_glm_scores_imp <- predict(glm_imp, test_imp) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
glm_predict_boolean_imp <- ifelse(pred_glm_scores >= threshold,1,0) 
 
glm_cm_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(glm_predict_boolean_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
glm_cm_imp 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(glm_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(glm_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(glm_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_glm_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, glm_predict_boolean_imp) 
plot.roc(roc_glm_imp, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM_IMP)): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm_imp)), col="orange") 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
set.seed(101) 
# Define train control for k fold cross validation 
train_control <- trainControl(method="cv", number=10, savePredictions = TRUE, classProbs = TRUE) 
# Fit Logistic Regression Model with Top10 features 
modelGLM_imp <- train(tender_isCorrupt~., data=train_imp, trControl=train_control, method="glm") 
# Summarise Results 
print(modelGLM_imp) 
#GLM with Cross Validation 
pred_glm_scores2_imp <- predict(modelGLM_imp, test_imp) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
glm_predict_boolean2_imp <- ifelse(pred_glm_scores2_imp >= threshold,1,0) 
 
glm_cm2_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(glm_predict_boolean2_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
glm_cm2_imp 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(glm_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(glm_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
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            MAE = MAE(glm_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Logistic Regression is:", glm_cm2_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_glm2_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, glm_predict_boolean2_imp) 
plot.roc(roc_glm2_imp, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM_IMP with CV)): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm2_imp)), col="orange") 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#Decision Tree with Top10 features 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(important_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(important_df)), replace = F) 
train_imp <- important_df[samples,] 
test_imp <- important_df[-samples,] 
 
tree_imp <- rpart(tender_isCorrupt~., train_imp) 
pred_tree_scores_imp <- predict(tree_imp, test_imp) 
 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
tree_predict_boolean_imp <- ifelse(pred_tree_scores_imp >= threshold,1,0) 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(tree_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(tree_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(tree_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(tree_predict_boolean_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm_imp 
 
print(paste("Recall of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Decision Tree is:", tree_cm_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_dt_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, predict(tree_imp, test_imp)) 
plot.roc(roc_dt_imp, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT_IMP)): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt_imp)), col="green") 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#Decision Tree with Cross Validation and Top10 features 
set.seed(101) 
# Define train control for k fold cross validation 
train_control <- trainControl(method="cv", number=10, savePredictions = TRUE, classProbs = TRUE) 
# Fit Decision Tree Model 
modelDT_imp <- train(tender_isCorrupt~., data=train_imp, trControl=train_control, method="rpart") 
# Summarise Results 
print(modelDT_imp) 
 
pred_tree_scores2_imp <- predict(modelDT_imp, test_imp) 
 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
tree_predict_boolean2_imp <- ifelse(pred_tree_scores2_imp >= threshold,1,0) 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(tree_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(tree_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(tree_predict_boolean2_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm2_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(tree_predict_boolean2_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
tree_cm2_imp 
 
print(paste("Recall of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Decision Tree with Cross Validation is:", tree_cm2_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
 
roc_dt2_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, predict(modelDT_imp, test_imp)) 
plot.roc(roc_dt2_imp, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT with CV_IMP)): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt2_imp)), col="green") 
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``` 
 
```{r} 
library(randomForest) 
#Random Forest with Top10 features 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(important_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(important_df)), replace = F) 
train_imp <- important_df[samples,] 
test_imp <- important_df[-samples,] 
#Random Forest 
rf_imp <- randomForest(tender_isCorrupt ~ ., train_imp, mtry=5, ntree=500) 
pred_rf_scores_imp <- predict(rf_imp, test_imp) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
rf_predict_boolean_imp <- ifelse(pred_rf_scores_imp >= threshold,1,0) 
 
rf_cm_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(rf_predict_boolean_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
rf_cm_imp 
 
data.frame( R2 = R2(rf_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            RMSE = RMSE(rf_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt), 
            MAE = MAE(rf_predict_boolean_imp, test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
 
print(paste("Recall of Random Forest is:", rf_cm_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of Random Forest is:", rf_cm_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of Random Forest is:", rf_cm_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
roc_rf_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, rf_predict_boolean) 
plot.roc(roc_rf_imp, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(RF_IMP)): %0.3f", auc(roc_rf_imp)), col="orange") 
 
 
``` 
 
```{r} 
#XGBOOST with Top10 features 
set.seed(101) 
samples <- sample.int(n = nrow(important_df), size = floor(0.8*nrow(important_df)), replace = F) 
train_imp <- important_df[samples,] 
test_imp <- important_df[-samples,] 
``` 
 
```{r} 
matrix_train_imp<- xgb.DMatrix(as.matrix(train_imp %>% select(-tender_isCorrupt)), label = train_imp$tender_isCorrupt) 
matrix_test_imp <- xgb.DMatrix(as.matrix(test_imp %>% select(-tender_isCorrupt)), label = test_imp$tender_isCorrupt) 
``` 
 
```{r} 
watchlist_imp <- list(train = matrix_train_imp, cv = matrix_test_imp) 
 
params <- list( 
  "objective" = "binary:logitraw", #Specify the learning task and the corresponding learning objective. 
  "eval_metric" = "auc" 
) 
 
model_xgb_imp <- xgb.train(params=params,  
                       data=matrix_train_imp, 
                       maximize=TRUE, # larger the evaluation score the better 
                       nrounds=50, # max number of boosting iterations 
                       nthread=3, # number of threads 
                       early_stopping_round=10, # stop if the performance doesn't improve for 10 rounds 
                       watchlist = watchlist_imp, # named list of xgb.DMatrix datasets to use for evaluating model performance 
                       print_every_n=5) # prints metrics for every 5th iteration 
``` 
 
### Ploting AUC 
 
Let's see how AUC changes with next iterations of model training  
 
```{r} 
75 
 
melted_imp <- melt(model_xgb_imp$evaluation_log, id.vars="iter") 
ggplot(data=melted_imp, aes(x=iter, y=value, group=variable, color = variable)) + geom_line() 
``` 
 
### Prediction 
 
Now let's predict fraud using test data: 
 
```{r} 
xgb_predict_scores_imp <- predict(model_xgb_imp, matrix_test_imp) 
threshold <-  0.5 # We set threshold for obtained scores 
xgb_predict_boolean_imp <- ifelse(xgb_predict_scores_imp >= threshold,1,0) 
``` 
 
And evaluate the result by creating confusion matrix: 
 
```{r} 
xgb_cm_imp <- confusionMatrix(as.factor(xgb_predict_boolean_imp), as.factor(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt)) 
xgb_cm_imp 
``` 
 
We can access different metrics from our confusion matrix. 
 
```{r} 
print(paste("Recall of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm_imp$byClass["Recall"])) 
print(paste("Precision of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm_imp$byClass["Precision"])) 
print(paste("F1 of XGBoost is:", xgb_cm_imp$byClass["F1"])) 
 
``` 
 
We can also create ROC and find AUC 
 
```{r} 
roc_xgb_imp <- roc(test_imp$tender_isCorrupt, predict(model_xgb_imp, matrix_test_imp, type = "prob")) 
plot.roc(roc_xgb_imp) 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(XGB_IMP)): %0.3f", auc(roc_xgb_imp)), col="black") 
``` 
 
## Result 
 
Let's compare all 4 AUC's and select the best one. 
 
```{r} 
plot.roc(roc_glm_imp, col="green") 
text(0.36, 0.53, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM_IMP): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm_imp)), col="green") 
 
lines(roc_dt_imp, col="orange") 
text(0.36, 0.33, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT_IMP): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt_imp)), col="orange") 
 
lines(roc_xgb_imp, col="black") 
text(0.36, 0.43, labels=sprintf("AUC(XGB_IMP): %0.3f", auc(roc_xgb)), col="black")  
 
lines(roc_rf_imp, col="red") 
text(0.36, 0.23, labels=sprintf("AUC(RF_IMP): %0.3f", auc(roc_rf_imp)), col="red")  
 
lines(roc_dt2_imp, col="yellow") 
text(0.36, 0.13, labels=sprintf("AUC(DT_IMP_CV): %0.3f", auc(roc_dt2_imp)), col="yellow") 
 
lines(roc_glm2_imp, col="purple") 
text(0.36, 0.03, labels=sprintf("AUC(GLM_IMP_CV): %0.3f", auc(roc_glm2_imp)), col="purple") 
 
``` 
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Appendix 3 – Descriptive statistics final data  
 
 
Figure 7. Descriptive statistics for the final data, compiled by author, source: Appendix 2 
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Appendix 4 – Descriptive statistics initial data  
##  tender_estimatedDurationInMonths tender_estimatedDurationInDays 
##  Min.   :  0.00                   Min.   :   1.00                
##  1st Qu.: 18.00                   1st Qu.:   3.00                
##  Median : 24.00                   Median :  12.00                
##  Mean   : 30.54                   Mean   :  24.87                
##  3rd Qu.: 37.00                   3rd Qu.:  24.00                
##  Max.   :300.00                   Max.   :2283.00                
##  NA's   :96023                    NA's   :51380                  
##  tender_estimatedPrice tender_finalPrice   tender_description_length 
##  Min.   :     125      Min.   :      102   Min.   :   1.0            
##  1st Qu.:   65100      1st Qu.:    17188   1st Qu.:  59.0            
##  Median :  210000      Median :    35280   Median : 110.0            
##  Mean   : 1226396      Mean   :   304779   Mean   : 208.2            
##  3rd Qu.:  634000      3rd Qu.:    84036   3rd Qu.: 224.0            
##  Max.   :95867473      Max.   :636824025   Max.   :3819.0            
##  NA's   :97787         NA's   :9817        NA's   :5597              
##  tender_personalRequirements_length tender_economicRequirements_length 
##  Min.   :  107                      Min.   :  93.0                     
##  1st Qu.: 2226                      1st Qu.: 294.0                     
##  Median : 2697                      Median : 423.0                     
##  Mean   : 2947                      Mean   : 588.3                     
##  3rd Qu.: 3587                      3rd Qu.: 618.0                     
##  Max.   :68527                      Max.   :9482.0                     
##  NA's   :47057                      NA's   :55393                      
##  tender_technicalRequirements_length tender_awardCriteria_count 
##  Min.   :   75                       Min.   : 1.000             
##  1st Qu.:  461                       1st Qu.: 1.000             
##  Median :  844                       Median : 1.000             
##  Mean   : 1692                       Mean   : 1.339             
##  3rd Qu.: 1770                       3rd Qu.: 1.000             
##  Max.   :40341                       Max.   :82.000             
##  NA's   :48547                       NA's   :8064               
##  tender_lots_count tender_publications_count 
##  Min.   : 1.000    Min.   : 1.000            
##  1st Qu.: 1.000    1st Qu.: 2.000            
##  Median : 1.000    Median : 2.000            
##  Mean   : 4.596    Mean   : 2.631            
##  3rd Qu.: 3.000    3rd Qu.: 3.000            
##  Max.   :95.000    Max.   :36.000            
##  NA's   :2249                                
##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_SINGLE_BID 
##  Min.   :  0.00                        
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                        
##  Median :100.00                        
##  Mean   : 68.44                        
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                        
##  Max.   :100.00                        
##  NA's   :15077                         
##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_CALL_FOR_TENDER_PUBLICATION 
##  Min.   :  0.00                                         
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                                         
##  Median :100.00                                         
##  Mean   : 60.78                                         
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                                         
##  Max.   :100.00                                         
##  NA's   :1                                              
##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_ADVERTISEMENT_PERIOD 
##  Min.   :  0.00                                  
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                                  
##  Median :100.00                                  
##  Mean   : 63.19                                  
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                                  
##  Max.   :100.00                                  
##  NA's   :7                                       
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##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_PROCEDURE_TYPE 
##  Min.   :  0.00                            
##  1st Qu.:100.00                            
##  Median :100.00                            
##  Mean   : 93.65                            
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                            
##  Max.   :100.00                            
##  NA's   :1                                 
##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_DECISION_PERIOD 
##  Min.   :  0.00                             
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                             
##  Median :100.00                             
##  Mean   : 70.35                             
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                             
##  Max.   :100.00                             
##  NA's   :6972                               
##  tender_indicator_INTEGRITY_TAX_HAVEN 
##  Min.   :  0.00                       
##  1st Qu.:100.00                       
##  Median :100.00                       
##  Mean   : 99.67                       
##  3rd Qu.:100.00                       
##  Max.   :100.00                       
##  NA's   :71638                        
##  tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_COVERED_BY_GPA 
##  Min.   :  0.00                                 
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                                 
##  Median :  0.00                                 
##  Mean   : 12.17                                 
##  3rd Qu.:  0.00                                 
##  Max.   :100.00                                 
##  NA's   :3260                                   
##  tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_FRAMEWORK_AGREEMENT 
##  Min.   :  0.000                                     
##  1st Qu.:  0.000                                     
##  Median :  0.000                                     
##  Mean   :  9.723                                     
##  3rd Qu.:  0.000                                     
##  Max.   :100.000                                     
##  NA's   :3260                                        
##  tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_ENGLISH_AS_FOREIGN_LANGUAGE 
##  Min.   :  0.00                                              
##  1st Qu.:  0.00                                              
##  Median :  0.00                                              
##  Mean   : 10.27                                              
##  3rd Qu.:  0.00                                              
##  Max.   :100.00                                              
##  NA's   :94564                                               
##  tender_indicator_ADMINISTRATIVE_NOTICE_AND_AWARD_DISCREPANCIES 
##  Min.   : 8.60                                                  
##  1st Qu.:66.67                                                  
##  Median :75.00                                                  
##  Mean   :69.37                                                  
##  3rd Qu.:76.92                                                  
##  Max.   :98.11                                                  
##  NA's   :42897                                                  
##    lot_row_nr     lot_estimatedPrice  lot_bidsCount     
##  Min.   : 1.000   Min.   :      111   Min.   :  1.000   
##  1st Qu.: 1.000   1st Qu.:    23250   1st Qu.:  1.000   
##  Median : 1.000   Median :    64970   Median :  3.000   
##  Mean   : 2.769   Mean   :   839518   Mean   :  3.632   
##  3rd Qu.: 1.000   3rd Qu.:   300000   3rd Qu.:  4.000   
##  Max.   :95.000   Max.   :636824025   Max.   :135.000   
##  NA's   :2250     NA's   :96671       NA's   :21399     
##  lot_description_length   bid_row_nr       bid_price         
##  Min.   :   3.0         Min.   : 1.000   Min.   :      100   
##  1st Qu.:  35.0         1st Qu.: 1.000   1st Qu.:    12493   
##  Median :  64.0         Median : 1.000   Median :    24954   
##  Mean   : 114.2         Mean   : 1.513   Mean   :   128583   
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##  3rd Qu.: 131.0         3rd Qu.: 2.000   3rd Qu.:    51595   
##  Max.   :2743.0         Max.   :52.000   Max.   :486966498   
##  NA's   :88336          NA's   :14646    NA's   :23810       
##  tender_isCorrupt    
##  Min.   :0.0000000   
##  1st Qu.:0.0000000   
##  Median :0.0000000   
##  Mean   :0.0005842   
##  3rd Qu.:0.0000000   
##  Max.   :1.0000000   
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